Author Topic: Filmari si povesti real ops  (Read 2922 times)

D13-th_Mytzu

  • Senil Chef'
  • Administrator
  • Posts: 13255
Filmari si povesti real ops
« on: January 20, 2014, 11:30:54 pm »
Operation Anaconda - The Battle of Roberts Ridge

D13-th_Mytzu

  • Senil Chef'
  • Administrator
  • Posts: 13255
Re: Filmari real ops
« Reply #1 on: January 21, 2014, 09:52:34 pm »
interesant - nu din punct de vedere al pac-pacului ci al perspectivei, oricum finalul este epic  :lol: :

D13-th_Mytzu

  • Senil Chef'
  • Administrator
  • Posts: 13255
Re: Filmari si povesti real ops
« Reply #2 on: February 22, 2014, 10:25:35 pm »
Op. Red Wings dupa care s-a facut si filmul Lone Survivor.
http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=c62091316c
Quote
Operation Red Wings
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
For the 1956 series of U.S. nuclear tests, see Operation Redwing.
Page semi-protected
Operation Red Wings
Part of the War in Afghanistan (2001–present)
Date    June 27, 2005 – mid-July, 2005[1][2]
Location    Sawtalo Sar Mountain, Shuryek (Matin) Valley, Korangal Valley, Pech District, Kunar Province, Afghanistan[1][2][3][4]
Result    Heavy US and Afghan casualties; operational targets temporarily withdraw from area

    Insurgent forces temporarily withdraw from the area while U.S. forces sustain heavy casualties[1][2][3][5]
    Insurgent forces return three weeks later

Belligerents
 United States    Afghanistan Local anti-Coalition militants

    Local pro-Taliban nationals

Commanders and leaders
Lieutenant Colonel Andrew MacMannis (USMC)[2]
LCDR Erik S. Kristensen †[6]
LT Michael P. Murphy †    Ahmad Shah
Strength
12 Navy SEALs
8 Night Stalkers
additional helicopter crews
2 MH-47 Chinook
2 UH-60 Black Hawk
2 AH-64D Apache helicopters    Ranging from 8–10 fighters to 70–100 depending on source[2][3][7][8]
Casualties and losses
19 killed, 1 wounded,
1 Chinook helicopter shot down[3][9]    Unknown, with the highest estimate 35 killed[10]

Unknown number of wounded
[show]

    v
    t
    e

War in Afghanistan
(2001–present)

Operation Red Wings (often incorrectly called "Operation Redwing" and/or "Operation Red Wing"[2][3][7][11][12]) was a combined / joint military operation during the War in Afghanistan (2001–present) in the Pech District of Afghanistan's Kunar Province, on the slopes of a mountain named Sawtalo Sar,[2][4][7] approximately 20 miles west of Kunar's provincial capital of Asadabad, in late June through mid-July 2005.[1][2][3] Operation Red Wings was intended to disrupt local anti-Coalition Militia (ACM) activity, thus contributing to regional stability and thereby facilitating the Afghani Parliament elections scheduled for September, 2005.[1][2][3] At the time, anti-Coalition Militia activity in the region was carried out most notably by a small group led by a local man from Nangarhar Province, Ahmad Shah, who had aspirations of regional Islamic fundamentalist prominence. He and his small group were among the primary targets of the operation.

The operation was conceived by the 2nd Battalion of the 3rd Marine Regiment (2/3) of the U.S. Marine Corps based on an operational model developed by 2/3's sister battalion, the 3rd Battalion of the 3rd Marine Regiment (3/3) which had preceded the 2nd Battalion in their combat deployment. It utilized special operations forces (SOF) units and assets, including members of the U.S. Navy SEALs and the U.S. Army Special Operations Command's 160th Special Operation's Aviation Regiment (Airborne) (SOAR(A)), for the opening phase of the operation.[2] A team of four Navy SEALs, tasked for surveillance and reconnaissance of a group of structures known to be used by Ahmad Shah and his men, fell into an ambush by Shah and his group just hours after inserting into the area by fastrope from an MH-47 helicopter.[2] Three of the four SEALs were killed and a quick reaction force helicopter sent in for their aid was shot down with an RPG-7 rocket propelled grenade, killing all eight Navy SEALs and all eight U.S. Army Special Operations aviators on board.

The operation then became known as "Red Wings II" and lasted approximately three more weeks,[1][2] during which time the bodies of the deceased SEALs and Army Special Operations aviators were recovered and the only surviving member of the initial team, Marcus Luttrell, was rescued.[6] While the goal of the operation was partially achieved, Ahmad Shah regrouped in Pakistan, and returned with more men and armament, aided by the notoriety he gained from the Red Wings ambush and helicopter shootdown. Several weeks later, Shah's group in Kunar Province was stricken to a point of inoperability and Shah was seriously wounded, during Operation Whalers, in August 2005.[1][2][7]

Contents

    1 Background and development
        1.1 Preceding operations and model
        1.2 Name of Operation
        1.3 Planning stages and intelligence gathering
    2 Execution of the operation
        2.1 Insertion of SEAL team, compromise, and ambush
        2.2 Red Wings II: quick reaction force, search, rescue, recovery, and presence operations
        2.3 Afghans who aided Luttrell
        2.4 American casualties
    3 Aftermath and repercussions
    4 Notable later events
        4.1 Military decorations and honors
        4.2 Ahmad Shah
    5 Disputed information
    6 Operation Red Wings in popular culture
    7 References
    8 Bibliography

Background and development
SEALs prior to Operation Red Wings (L to R): Matthew Axelson, Daniel R. Healy, James Suh, Marcus Luttrell, Eric S. Patton, Michael P. Murphy

After the initial invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, U.S. Military and coalition partner operations shifted from "kinetic" operations to those of a counterinsurgency (COIN) nature.[2] One of the primary goals of the coalition by 2004 in Afghanistan was nation building, that is, providing a security environment conducive to the establishment and growth of a democratically elected government, as well as infrastructure support.[1][2] A key milestone in this campaign would be the September 18, 2005 Afghan National Parliamentary Elections.[1][2] While many of Afghanistan's provinces at this time had stable security environments, one of the most restive continued to be the Kunar Province, which lies in eastern Afghanistan, on the border with Pakistan. For election results to be seen as legitimate by the citizens of Afghanistan and the world at large, all elections throughout the country would need to proceed "unencumbered" – (without external influence, by either American and coalition forces or Taliban and anti-American and coalition forces), including those in Kunar.[2][7] Insurgent activity in the Kunar Province during this time came from 22 identified groups,[2][7] individual groups of which ranged in allegiance from those with tenuous ties to the Taliban and al Qaeda, to the majority that were little more than local criminals.[2] These groups were collectively known as Anti-Coalition Militia (ACM),[1][2] and the common thread among all was a strong resistance to the unification of the country and subsequent increasing presence of national government entities in the Kunar, as these would pose a threat to their activities, be these activities attempting to aid a resurgent neo-Taliban, to lumber smuggling.[1][2] With the goal of successful elections in Kunar, military operations in the area focused primarily on the disruption of ACM activity, and these military operations utilized a number of different units and operational constructs to achieve this goal.
Preceding operations and model

The 3rd Battalion of the 3rd Marine Regiment (3/3), which deployed to Regional Command (East) (RC(E)) (which included the Kunar Province) in late 2004 to conduct stability and counterinsurgency operations in support of Operation Enduring Freedom, identified a number of operational barriers due to Special Operations Command doctrine for the battalion's counterinsurgency work in the area.[2] These barriers included non-sharing of intelligence with the battalion and non-disclosure of impending raids by special operations units in the area.[13] To mitigate these problems, 3/3's staff developed an operational model which integrated special operations forces units into their operations, allowing the sharing of intelligence between the battalion and special operations forces as well as maintaining solid operational control of operations with integrated special operations assets and units by the battalion.[2][13] Operations that 3/3 conducted based on this model proved successful in disrupting ACM activity. The first of these, Operation Spurs (named after the San Antonio Spurs basketball team), conducted in February 2005, took place in the Korangal Valley, in the Kunar Province's Pech District.[14] Spurs utilized Navy SEALs for the opening two phases of this five phase operation.[2] Similar operations that followed included Operation Mavericks (named after the Dallas Mavericks basketball team), in April, 2005,[15] and Operation Celtics (named after the Boston Celtics basketball team) in May 2005.[16] These operations, all of which included Navy SEALs, were conceived and planned by the battalion, with the specifics of those phases involving Navy SEALs being planned by the SEALs.[2][13] Each operation lasted between three and four weeks.[17] 3/3 planned and executed approximately one of these operations per month, maintaining a consistent operational tempo.[2][17] The culmination of 3/3's efforts was the April, 2005 forced surrender of a regional (and national) "high value" target, an ACM commander known as Najmudeen, who based his operations out of the Korangal Valley.[2][17] With the surrender of Najmudeen, ACM activity in the region dropped significantly. Najmudeen's surrender, however, left a power vacuum in the region.[2][7][17]

3/3 tracked a number of known ACM groups they determined to be possibly seeking to fill the power void in the region. The battalion began planning a new operation, tentatively called Operation Stars (which was named after the Dallas Stars professional hockey team (3/3's battalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel Norman Cooling, hailed from Texas,[18] hence most operations being named after Texas sports teams)).[2][7][14][15][16][17] Stars, like the other operations before it, focused on disrupting ACM activity, although due to Najmudeen's surrender, this activity had dropped and specific groups proved difficult to pinpoint.[2] In May 2005, the Advanced Party of 3/3's sister battalion, the 2nd Battalion of the 3rd Marine Regiment (2/3) arrived in RC(E). Since before deploying to Afghanistan, 2/3's intelligence officer, Captain Scott Westerfield and his assistants, had been tracking a small cell led by a man named Ahmad Shah, based on intelligence sent back by 3/3's intelligence officer. Shah was from a remote region in Nangarhar Province, which borders the Kunar Province. Shah, they determined, was responsible for approximately 11 incidents against coalition forces and Government of Afghanistan entities, including small arms ambushes and improvised explosive device attacks. By June, 2005, 2/3 had relieved-in-place 3/3, and had taken the Stars concept and developed a comprehensive operation, an operation they called Operation Red Wings, with the goal of disrupting Anti-Coalition Militia Activity, with an emphasis on disrupting Ahmad Shah's activities, which were based near the summit of Sawtalo Sar.[1][2][4][7][17]
Name of Operation

When the 2nd Battalion of the 3rd Marine Regiment (2/3) took the Stars model and developed the specifics of it, 2/3's operations officer, Major Thomas Wood, instructed an assistant operations officer, 1st Lieutenant Lance Seiffert, to compose a list of hockey team names.[2][7] 2/3 would continue the use of hockey team names for large operations.[2] The Seiffert list[19] included ten teams,[2][7][19] and the battalion settled on the fourth name on the list, "Red Wings," since the first three, New York Rangers, Chicago Blackhawks, and New Jersey Devils, each could be misconstrued as a reference to military units currently in Afghanistan at the time.[2][7]

The name has been widely mis-stated as "Operation Redwing" and sometimes "Operation Red Wing." Operation Redwing was a 1956 series of nuclear weapons tests.[20] This error began with the publication of the book Lone Survivor: The Eyewitness Account of Operation Redwing and the Lost Heroes of SEAL Team 10, which was written by Patrick Robinson based on unrecorded interviews with Marcus Luttrell.[3][11][12][21][22]

2/3 eventually abandoned this naming convention out of sensitivity to the local population, instead opting for using Dari names for animals,[2] including Pil. (elephant)[23] and Sorkh Khar (red donkey)[24]
Planning stages and intelligence gathering
A map of the area and plan relating to Operation Red Wings

2/3's battalion staff immediately began planning Operation Red Wings as soon as they arrived in Afghanistan. Lieutenant Colonel Andrew MacMannis, 2/3's battalion commander, and his staff, wanted to maintain the operational tempo set by 3/3. 2/3's Operations Officer, Major Thomas Wood, began planning Red Wings off the Stars base, which was a five phase operation. During this time, 2/3's Intelligence Officer, Captain Scott Westerfield, focused further on learning about Ahmad Shah. His overall intelligence picture of Shah took a substantial leap when 2nd Lieutenant Regan Turner, a platoon commander with 2/3's "Whiskey Company" – a Weapons Company augmented to function like an infantry line company, gathered a wealth of human intelligence about Shah during a patrol, including his full name: Ahmad Shah Dara-I-nur (Ahmad Shah of the Valley of the Enlightened ones); his birthplace, the Kuz Kunar District of Nangarhar Province; his primary alias: Ismael; his chief allegiance: Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, who was based out of the Shamshatoo Refugee Camp near Peshawar, Pakistan; his team's size: fifty to one hundred fighters; and his aspirations: to impede the upcoming elections and attempt to aid a resurgent Taliban in the region. Although Shah was a relatively unknown entity in the region, he apparently held regional aspirations and possibly had the assistance of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. 2nd Lieutenant Turner also gathered a number of photographs of Shah.[2][25][26][27][28]

Further intelligence, including human intelligence and signals intelligence indicated that Shah based his insurgent / terrorist operations out of some small structures outside of the village of Chichal, high on the slopes of Sawtalo Sar mountain in the upper Korangal Valley, approximately 20 miles to the west of Kunar's provincial capital, Asadabad. Using imagery Intelligence, taken from a UAV on June 17, 2005, Westerfield identified likely structures used for housing his team, IED making, and overwatch of the area below, for IED strikes. The intelligence staff identified four Named Areas of Interest, or NAIs containing specific structures which Shah might be using.[2][4] These Named Areas of Interest and specific buildings were determined by analyzing and processing a number of instances of a variety of intelligence, including signals intelligence, human Intelligence, and imagery Intelligence.[2] Westerfield and his staff determined that Shah and his men had been responsible for approximately 11 incidents against American, Coalition, and Government of Afghanistan entities, including IED strikes and small arms ambushes. They determined that Shah and his men would be occupying the area of Chichal in late June, a time of low lunar illumination. The operation would require a helicopter insert of forces to cordon the area and search for Shah and his men, and they sought to conduct this operation at night, after positive identification of Shah by a Marine Corps Scout / Sniper team, which would walk into the area under cover of darkness some nights before.[2]

As with 3/3 before them, 2/3 sought to use Special Operations Forces assets for Red Wings, but unlike 3/3, they sought only the use of Special Operations Aviation assets, specifically, MH-47 Special Operations Aircraft of the Army Special Operations Command's 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (Airborne) (SOAR(A)), and not ground forces. The command from which 2/3's planners requested this, however, CJSOTF-A, or Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force – Afghanistan, refused this request, stating that in order for Red Wings to be supported with Special Operations aviation, the battalion would have to task the opening phases of the operation to Special Operations Ground Forces for the opening phases of the operation, with Marines of 2/3 acting in a supporting role. After the initial phases of Red Wings, then 2/3 could be considered the lead, supported element. The battalion agreed to this, realizing, however, that this unconventional command structure defied a fundamental tenet of successful military operations – "unity of command".[1][13] The operation was presented to a number of Special Operations units working in the area for possible "buy in." U.S. Navy SEALs from SEAL Team 10 and SEAL Delivery Vehicle Team 1 expressed interest.[1][2]
Execution of the operation

Red Wings was planned as a five phase operation:

    Phase 1: Shaping: A U.S. Navy SEAL reconnaissance and surveillance team is tasked to insert in the region of the suspected safe buildings of Ahmad Shah, observe and identify Shah and his men and specific locations, and guide a direct action team of phase two to structures in which Shah and his men are observed to be staying.
    Phase 2: Action on the Objective: A SEAL direct action team is to insert by MH-47, followed shortly by Marines, to capture or kill Shah and his men.
    Phase 3: Outer Cordon: Marines, along with Afghan National Army soldiers, are to sweep surrounding valleys for other suspected insurgents.
    Phase 4: Security and Stabilization: In the days after the first three phases, Marines and Afghan National Army soldiers and Navy Corpsmen will provide medical care to the local population and determine local needs, such as improved roads, wells, and schools.
    Phase 5: Exfiltration: Depending on enemy activity, the Marines will remain in the area for up to one month, then depart the area.

While the Marines planned the overall operation, the SEALs planned the specifics of their roles of Red Wings.[2][7]
Insertion of SEAL team, compromise, and ambush

Late in the night of June 27, 2005, two MH-47 Special Operations Aircraft of the Army Special Operations Command's 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (Airborne) (SOAR(A)) approached Sawtalo Sar. As one of the aircraft performed a number of "decoy drops" to confuse any possible enemy on the ground as to the specific purpose of helicopters, the other inserted, via fastrope, a four-man Navy SEAL reconnaissance and surveillance team in a saddle between Sawtalo Sar and Gatigal Sar, a peak just to the south of Sawtalo Sar. The insert point was roughly one and one half miles from the nearest Named Area of Interest.[4] The team members were team leader Navy Lieutenant Michael P. Murphy of SEAL Delivery Vehicle Team 1 (SDVT-1), based out of Pearl Harbor, Hawaii; Petty Officer Second Class Danny P. Dietz from SEAL Delivery Vehicle Team 2 (SDVT-2), based out of Virginia Beach, Virginia; Petty Officer Second Class Matthew G. Axelson from SEAL Delivery Vehicle Team 1 (SDVT-1); and Navy Hospital Corpsman Second Class Marcus Luttrell, of SEAL Delivery Vehicle Team 1 (SDVT-1).[2][4] After moving to a pre-determined, covered overwatch position, from which the SEALs could observe the Named Areas of Interest, the team was discovered by local goatherds. After determining that they were civilians, and not combatants, Lieutenant Murphy had them released, according to rules of engagement.[2][29]

The team, surmising that they would likely be compromised, retreated to a fallback position. Within an hour, the SEAL Reconnaissance and Surveillance team was ambushed by Shah and his men. The SEALs were attacked by RPK light machine guns, AK-47s, RPG-7 Rocket Propelled Grenades, and 82mm mortars.[2][3] The intensity of the incoming fire, combined with the type of ambush forced the SEAL team into the northeast gulch of Sawtalo Sar, on the Shuryek Valley side of Sawtalo Sar.[2][3][4] The SEALs made a number of attempts to contact their combat operations center with a multi-band radio and then with a satellite phone.[2] The team could not establish consistent communication, other than for a period long enough to indicate that they were under attack.[3] Three of the four team members were killed, and the only survivor, Marcus Luttrell, was left unconscious with a number of fractures and other serious wounds. He regained consciousness and was rescued by local Pashtun, who ultimately saved his life, as in his condition, without assistance, he would surely have been killed or captured by the Taliban.[6][30][31][32]
Red Wings II: quick reaction force, search, rescue, recovery, and presence operations

With the communication that the SEAL reconnaissance and surveillance team was ambushed, the focus of the operation immediately shifted from disrupting ACM activity to finding, aiding, and extracting the SEALs of the reconnaissance and surveillance team. The operation was now known as Operation Red Wings II.[1]

After the broken transmission from the SEAL reconnaissance and surveillance team, the position and situation of the SEALs became unknown. Members of SEAL Team 10, U.S. Marines, and aviators of the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment were prepared to dispatch a quick reaction force, but command for launch from higher special operations headquarters was delayed for a number of hours. A quick reaction force finally launched, consisting of two MH-47 Special Operations Aircraft of the 160th, two UH-60 conventional Army aviation Black Hawk helicopters, and two AH-64 Apache attack helicopters. The two MH-47s took the lead. Upon reaching Sawtalo Sar, the two MH-47s received small arms fire. During an attempt to insert SEALs who were riding in one of the MH-47 helicopters, one of Ahmad Shah's men fired an RPG-7 rocket propelled grenade, which struck the transmission below the rear rotor assembly, causing the aircraft to immediately plummet to the ground, killing all eight 160th Army Special Operations Aviators and crew, and all eight Navy SEALs who were passengers. Both commanders of the 160th, Ground commander LCDR Erik S. Kristensen, of SEAL Team 10, and aviation element commander Major Stephen C. Reich, were killed in the shootdown. Command and control (C2) at this point was lost, and neither visual nor radio contact could be established with the SEAL reconnaissance and surveillance team. At this point, which was late in the afternoon, storm clouds were moving in over the region. The aircraft returned to their respective bases, and a massive search began, at first from the ground, and then with aviation assets. The 16 bodies of those killed in the MH-47 shootdown were recovered. After an intensive search, the bodies of Dietz, Murphy, and Axelson were eventually recovered, and Marcus Luttrell was rescued, his survival due in part to the aid of a local Afghan villager in the village of Salar Ban, roughly 0.7 miles down the Northeast Gulch of Sawtalo Sar[4] from the location of the ambush.[1][2]
Afghans who aided Luttrell

In the years following Operation Red Wings more details emerged about the circumstances surrounding Luttrell being given sanctuary by local villagers and the aftermath. Many of the details regarding the Afghans who aided Luttrell were reported incorrectly in the American press during the days after the events occurred.[33]

The SEALs firefight with Ahmad Shah's Taliban forces began along a high-elevation ridgeline called Sawtalo Sar.[34] (The highest peak of this ridgeline is 2830 meters (9,282 feet).[35] A descent down the west side of the ridgeline leads into the Shuryek valley. The northeastern gulch in which the SEALs became trapped was in this direction, above the village of Salar Ban. To the east of the Sawtalo Sar ridgeline is the Korangal valley. As the wounded Luttrell descended the gulch, he encountered a Pashtun named Mohammad Gulab Khan from the mountain village of Salar Ban.[36] Known simply as Gulab, he took Luttrell into his home that first day and evoked the assistance of others from his village to protect Luttrell until American forces could be contacted. This was in accordance with the cultural tradition of Pashtunwali, whereby asylum (Nanawatai) is offered to a person to protect them from their enemies.

It is likely Luttrell would have been turned over to the Taliban had he descended into the Korangal instead of Shuryek.[37] While the villagers of the Shuryek valley weren't considered overly friendly to American forces they were nonetheless less hostile than villagers in the nearby mountainous Chichal (part of neighboring Korangal), with whom the Shuryek villagers have been traditionally been at odds over grazing-land boundaries.

Not long before Operation Red Wings had occurred, relations with the Americans had improved in the Shuryek Valley and the greater Pech river region because of humanitarian work that had been occurring. Medical services had been extended, and a girls school was built at Nangalam.[37] Gulab was aware of these developments and had introduced himself to the Marine commander at Nangalam, Matt Bartels, when he was visiting Matin.[38] It was within this context that Gulab stumbled upon Luttrell and gave him sanctuary.[39] The Taliban leader, Ahmad Shah, knew that the wounded soldier that he was tracking had to pass through the village of Salar Ban as he contoured downhill. Through intimidation Shah was able to ascertain which house sheltered the wounded soldier and demanded that he be turned over. But Shah couldn't risk a fight at that moment because he was outnumbered and other relatives and villagers would come to Gulab's aid. Luttrell was subsequently moved to different places until forces could arrive to extract him.

Luttrell wrote a note and asked that it be taken to the American base at Asadabad. Because Gulab had previously met the Marine commander based at Nangalam, he asked an older man named Shina, of another part of the village of Salar Ban, to make the trek with the note to that base instead.[36] This required a longer journey down the trails of the Shuryek valley to Matin, where he then hired a cab to drive the Pech road to Nangalam.[40] Gulab gave Shina 1000 Afghanis (about twenty U.S. dollars). When Shina reached the base in Nangalam in the middle of the night he met with the commander and related the story about a wounded American soldier in their village. He then gave him the note that Luttrell had written.[41]

In the weeks following Marcus Luttrell's rescue, Gulab and his family received threats from the Taliban and they were relocated to Asadabad.[33]
American casualties
Michael P. Murphy, Lt US Navy, Medal of Honor Recipient.
Army plaque in memory of the fallen Night Stalkers
Name    Age    Action    Hometown
Navy SEALs
LT Michael P. Murphy    29    Part of 4-Man SEAL team, killed in an ambush    Patchogue, New York
SO2 Matthew Axelson    29    Cupertino, California[42]
SO2 Danny Dietz    25    Littleton, Colorado[42]
SOC Jacques J. Fontan    36    Killed aboard the helicopter when it was shot down    New Orleans, Louisiana
SOCS Daniel R. Healy    36    Exeter, New Hampshire
LCDR Erik S. Kristensen    33    San Diego, California
SO1 Jeffery A. Lucas    33    Corbett, Oregon
LT Michael M. McGreevy, Jr.    30    Portville, New York
SO2 James E. Suh    28    Deerfield Beach, Florida
SO1 Jeffrey S. Taylor    30    Midway, West Virginia
SO2 Shane E. Patton    22    Boulder City, Nevada
160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment[9]
SSG Shamus O. Goare    29    Killed aboard the helicopter when it was shot down    Danville, Ohio
CWO3 Corey J. Goodnature    35    Clarks Grove, Minnesota.
SGT Kip A. Jacoby    21    Pompano Beach, Florida
SFC Marcus V. Muralles    33    Shelbyville, Indiana
MSG James W. Ponder III    36    Franklin, Tennessee
MAJ Stephen C. Reich    34    Washington Depot, Connecticut.
SFC Michael L. Russell    31    Stafford, Virginia
CWO4 Chris J. Scherkenbach    40    Jacksonville, Florida
Aftermath and repercussions

Ahmad Shah and his group recovered a large amount of weapons, ammunition, and other materials, including three SOPMOD M4 Carbines fitted with M203 40mm grenade launchers, a ruggedized laptop with an intact hard drive containing maps of embassies in Kabul, night vision equipment, and a sniper spotting scope, among other items from the Navy SEAL reconnaissance and surveillance team, items which they could then use against American, Coalition, and Government of Afghanistan entities. Shah had with him two videographers during the ambush, and As-Sahab Media released a video of the ambush and the items recovered from the SEALs.

A large amount of resources were devoted to the search, rescue, and recovery operations of Red Wings II. As such, Ahmad Shah and his men left the region and regrouped in Pakistan. During the following weeks of Red Wings II, ground units of 2/3 undertook a number of patrols, as did members of the Afghan National Army, Army Special Operations units, and Navy Special Operations units. These "presence operations" achieved the goal of disrupting anti-coalition militia activity, but at great cost, and upon the exfiltration of troops, Ahmad Shah and his reinforced cell was able to return to the area weeks later.[2]

A tremendous amount of global media attention was focused on the ambush and the MH-47 shootdown. The size of Shah's group increased as additional fighters joined his ranks. With the withdrawal of American and Coalition troops at the end of Red Wings II, Shah and his group was able to return to the Kunar Province and begin attacks again. The "sequel" to Operation Red Wings was Operation Whalers, which 2/3 planned and executed in August 2005.[2][3] Some survivors have suffered from PTSD.[43]
Notable later events
Military decorations and honors

On September 14, 2006, Dietz and Axelson were posthumously awarded the Navy Cross for "undaunted courage" and heroism. Luttrell was also awarded the Navy Cross in a ceremony at the White House. In 2007, Murphy was posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor for his actions during the battle.

On June 28, 2008, Luttrell and the family members of soldiers killed overseas were honored at a San Diego Padres game.[44] In addition, the United States Navy Parachute Team, the Leap Frogs, brought in the American flag, the POW/MIA flag and the San Diego Padres flag. The attendees were given a standing ovation by the more than 25,000 there to watch the game.

A statue entitled The Guardians stands in the Cupertino Veterans Memorial Park, in Cupertino, California. The statue depicts both Matthew Axelson and James Suh, natives of the region, standing back-to-back.[45]
Ahmad Shah

Shah's group in Kunar Province was neutralized and Shah was seriously wounded during Operation Whalers weeks later in August 2005.[1][2][7]

In April 2008, Shah was killed during a shootout with Pakistani police in the Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa.[46]
Disputed information

There exists some conflict over the exact numbers of Taliban forces involved in the engagement, among other mistakes by some sources. In Luttrell's own official after-action report filed with his superiors after his rescue, he estimated the size of the Taliban force to be around 20–35. Luttrell claims in his book that during the briefing his team was told around 80 to 200 fighters were expected to be in the area.[6] Initial intel estimates estimated approximately 10 to 20.[3] Official media reports from the military estimated the size of the Taliban force to be around 20 as well, while in the Medal of Honor citation for LT Michael P. Murphy, the Navy cited 30–40 enemies.[47] In the Summary of Action related to the same MOH, the Navy cites an "enemy force of more than 50 anti-coalition militia".[48] In his book, Victory Point: Operations Red Wings and Whalers – the Marine Corps' Battle for Freedom in Afghanistan, military journalist Ed Darack cites a military intelligence report stating the strength of the Taliban force to be 8–10, compared to the more than 200 claimed by Patrick Robinson in Lone Survivor. The military intelligence estimate cited by Darack is based on research sourced from intelligence reports, including aerial and eye-witness studies of the battlefield after the fact, including the men sent in to rescue Luttrell, as well as reports from Afghan intelligence.[3][11][12]

The claim in Lone Survivor by Patrick Robinson that Lieutenant Murphy even considered and then put to vote the possible execution of the unarmed civilians who stumbled upon the SEAL reconnaissance and surveillance team has been roundly criticized and dismissed by many as fiction. In an article by Sean Naylor, Army Times senior correspondent, Navy Special Warfare Command spokesman Lieutenant Steve Ruh stated that with respect to making command decisions in the field, "Whether they’re officer or enlisted, the senior guy ultimately has the ultimate authority." And with regards to voting whether or not to execute unarmed civilians, he admitted, "This is the first time I’ve ever heard of anything put to a vote like that. In my 14 years of Navy experience, I’ve never seen or heard of anything like that."[32]

In the June 12, 2007 article "Survivor's book dishonors son's memory" by Michael Rothfeld in Newsday, Michael P. Murphy's father Dan claims that Lieutenant Murphy would never have considered executing unarmed civilians, let alone putting such a grave decision up for a vote (in reference to the purported vote of execution of unarmed locals). Military protocol, United States and international military doctrine, and rules of engagement strictly forbid harming unarmed non-combatant civilians, with one of the specific rules of engagement in effect at the time stating, "Civilians are not targets!"[29][49][50]

Operation Whalers finalizare la Red Wings (lol).

http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=c62091316c
Quote
Operation Red Wings
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
For the 1956 series of U.S. nuclear tests, see Operation Redwing.
Page semi-protected
Operation Red Wings
Part of the War in Afghanistan (2001–present)
Date    June 27, 2005 – mid-July, 2005[1][2]
Location    Sawtalo Sar Mountain, Shuryek (Matin) Valley, Korangal Valley, Pech District, Kunar Province, Afghanistan[1][2][3][4]
Result    Heavy US and Afghan casualties; operational targets temporarily withdraw from area

    Insurgent forces temporarily withdraw from the area while U.S. forces sustain heavy casualties[1][2][3][5]
    Insurgent forces return three weeks later

Belligerents
 United States    Afghanistan Local anti-Coalition militants

    Local pro-Taliban nationals

Commanders and leaders
Lieutenant Colonel Andrew MacMannis (USMC)[2]
LCDR Erik S. Kristensen †[6]
LT Michael P. Murphy †    Ahmad Shah
Strength
12 Navy SEALs
8 Night Stalkers
additional helicopter crews
2 MH-47 Chinook
2 UH-60 Black Hawk
2 AH-64D Apache helicopters    Ranging from 8–10 fighters to 70–100 depending on source[2][3][7][8]
Casualties and losses
19 killed, 1 wounded,
1 Chinook helicopter shot down[3][9]    Unknown, with the highest estimate 35 killed[10]

Unknown number of wounded
[show]

    v
    t
    e

War in Afghanistan
(2001–present)

Operation Red Wings (often incorrectly called "Operation Redwing" and/or "Operation Red Wing"[2][3][7][11][12]) was a combined / joint military operation during the War in Afghanistan (2001–present) in the Pech District of Afghanistan's Kunar Province, on the slopes of a mountain named Sawtalo Sar,[2][4][7] approximately 20 miles west of Kunar's provincial capital of Asadabad, in late June through mid-July 2005.[1][2][3] Operation Red Wings was intended to disrupt local anti-Coalition Militia (ACM) activity, thus contributing to regional stability and thereby facilitating the Afghani Parliament elections scheduled for September, 2005.[1][2][3] At the time, anti-Coalition Militia activity in the region was carried out most notably by a small group led by a local man from Nangarhar Province, Ahmad Shah, who had aspirations of regional Islamic fundamentalist prominence. He and his small group were among the primary targets of the operation.

The operation was conceived by the 2nd Battalion of the 3rd Marine Regiment (2/3) of the U.S. Marine Corps based on an operational model developed by 2/3's sister battalion, the 3rd Battalion of the 3rd Marine Regiment (3/3) which had preceded the 2nd Battalion in their combat deployment. It utilized special operations forces (SOF) units and assets, including members of the U.S. Navy SEALs and the U.S. Army Special Operations Command's 160th Special Operation's Aviation Regiment (Airborne) (SOAR(A)), for the opening phase of the operation.[2] A team of four Navy SEALs, tasked for surveillance and reconnaissance of a group of structures known to be used by Ahmad Shah and his men, fell into an ambush by Shah and his group just hours after inserting into the area by fastrope from an MH-47 helicopter.[2] Three of the four SEALs were killed and a quick reaction force helicopter sent in for their aid was shot down with an RPG-7 rocket propelled grenade, killing all eight Navy SEALs and all eight U.S. Army Special Operations aviators on board.

The operation then became known as "Red Wings II" and lasted approximately three more weeks,[1][2] during which time the bodies of the deceased SEALs and Army Special Operations aviators were recovered and the only surviving member of the initial team, Marcus Luttrell, was rescued.[6] While the goal of the operation was partially achieved, Ahmad Shah regrouped in Pakistan, and returned with more men and armament, aided by the notoriety he gained from the Red Wings ambush and helicopter shootdown. Several weeks later, Shah's group in Kunar Province was stricken to a point of inoperability and Shah was seriously wounded, during Operation Whalers, in August 2005.[1][2][7]

Contents

    1 Background and development
        1.1 Preceding operations and model
        1.2 Name of Operation
        1.3 Planning stages and intelligence gathering
    2 Execution of the operation
        2.1 Insertion of SEAL team, compromise, and ambush
        2.2 Red Wings II: quick reaction force, search, rescue, recovery, and presence operations
        2.3 Afghans who aided Luttrell
        2.4 American casualties
    3 Aftermath and repercussions
    4 Notable later events
        4.1 Military decorations and honors
        4.2 Ahmad Shah
    5 Disputed information
    6 Operation Red Wings in popular culture
    7 References
    8 Bibliography

Background and development
SEALs prior to Operation Red Wings (L to R): Matthew Axelson, Daniel R. Healy, James Suh, Marcus Luttrell, Eric S. Patton, Michael P. Murphy

After the initial invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, U.S. Military and coalition partner operations shifted from "kinetic" operations to those of a counterinsurgency (COIN) nature.[2] One of the primary goals of the coalition by 2004 in Afghanistan was nation building, that is, providing a security environment conducive to the establishment and growth of a democratically elected government, as well as infrastructure support.[1][2] A key milestone in this campaign would be the September 18, 2005 Afghan National Parliamentary Elections.[1][2] While many of Afghanistan's provinces at this time had stable security environments, one of the most restive continued to be the Kunar Province, which lies in eastern Afghanistan, on the border with Pakistan. For election results to be seen as legitimate by the citizens of Afghanistan and the world at large, all elections throughout the country would need to proceed "unencumbered" – (without external influence, by either American and coalition forces or Taliban and anti-American and coalition forces), including those in Kunar.[2][7] Insurgent activity in the Kunar Province during this time came from 22 identified groups,[2][7] individual groups of which ranged in allegiance from those with tenuous ties to the Taliban and al Qaeda, to the majority that were little more than local criminals.[2] These groups were collectively known as Anti-Coalition Militia (ACM),[1][2] and the common thread among all was a strong resistance to the unification of the country and subsequent increasing presence of national government entities in the Kunar, as these would pose a threat to their activities, be these activities attempting to aid a resurgent neo-Taliban, to lumber smuggling.[1][2] With the goal of successful elections in Kunar, military operations in the area focused primarily on the disruption of ACM activity, and these military operations utilized a number of different units and operational constructs to achieve this goal.
Preceding operations and model

The 3rd Battalion of the 3rd Marine Regiment (3/3), which deployed to Regional Command (East) (RC(E)) (which included the Kunar Province) in late 2004 to conduct stability and counterinsurgency operations in support of Operation Enduring Freedom, identified a number of operational barriers due to Special Operations Command doctrine for the battalion's counterinsurgency work in the area.[2] These barriers included non-sharing of intelligence with the battalion and non-disclosure of impending raids by special operations units in the area.[13] To mitigate these problems, 3/3's staff developed an operational model which integrated special operations forces units into their operations, allowing the sharing of intelligence between the battalion and special operations forces as well as maintaining solid operational control of operations with integrated special operations assets and units by the battalion.[2][13] Operations that 3/3 conducted based on this model proved successful in disrupting ACM activity. The first of these, Operation Spurs (named after the San Antonio Spurs basketball team), conducted in February 2005, took place in the Korangal Valley, in the Kunar Province's Pech District.[14] Spurs utilized Navy SEALs for the opening two phases of this five phase operation.[2] Similar operations that followed included Operation Mavericks (named after the Dallas Mavericks basketball team), in April, 2005,[15] and Operation Celtics (named after the Boston Celtics basketball team) in May 2005.[16] These operations, all of which included Navy SEALs, were conceived and planned by the battalion, with the specifics of those phases involving Navy SEALs being planned by the SEALs.[2][13] Each operation lasted between three and four weeks.[17] 3/3 planned and executed approximately one of these operations per month, maintaining a consistent operational tempo.[2][17] The culmination of 3/3's efforts was the April, 2005 forced surrender of a regional (and national) "high value" target, an ACM commander known as Najmudeen, who based his operations out of the Korangal Valley.[2][17] With the surrender of Najmudeen, ACM activity in the region dropped significantly. Najmudeen's surrender, however, left a power vacuum in the region.[2][7][17]

3/3 tracked a number of known ACM groups they determined to be possibly seeking to fill the power void in the region. The battalion began planning a new operation, tentatively called Operation Stars (which was named after the Dallas Stars professional hockey team (3/3's battalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel Norman Cooling, hailed from Texas,[18] hence most operations being named after Texas sports teams)).[2][7][14][15][16][17] Stars, like the other operations before it, focused on disrupting ACM activity, although due to Najmudeen's surrender, this activity had dropped and specific groups proved difficult to pinpoint.[2] In May 2005, the Advanced Party of 3/3's sister battalion, the 2nd Battalion of the 3rd Marine Regiment (2/3) arrived in RC(E). Since before deploying to Afghanistan, 2/3's intelligence officer, Captain Scott Westerfield and his assistants, had been tracking a small cell led by a man named Ahmad Shah, based on intelligence sent back by 3/3's intelligence officer. Shah was from a remote region in Nangarhar Province, which borders the Kunar Province. Shah, they determined, was responsible for approximately 11 incidents against coalition forces and Government of Afghanistan entities, including small arms ambushes and improvised explosive device attacks. By June, 2005, 2/3 had relieved-in-place 3/3, and had taken the Stars concept and developed a comprehensive operation, an operation they called Operation Red Wings, with the goal of disrupting Anti-Coalition Militia Activity, with an emphasis on disrupting Ahmad Shah's activities, which were based near the summit of Sawtalo Sar.[1][2][4][7][17]
Name of Operation

When the 2nd Battalion of the 3rd Marine Regiment (2/3) took the Stars model and developed the specifics of it, 2/3's operations officer, Major Thomas Wood, instructed an assistant operations officer, 1st Lieutenant Lance Seiffert, to compose a list of hockey team names.[2][7] 2/3 would continue the use of hockey team names for large operations.[2] The Seiffert list[19] included ten teams,[2][7][19] and the battalion settled on the fourth name on the list, "Red Wings," since the first three, New York Rangers, Chicago Blackhawks, and New Jersey Devils, each could be misconstrued as a reference to military units currently in Afghanistan at the time.[2][7]

The name has been widely mis-stated as "Operation Redwing" and sometimes "Operation Red Wing." Operation Redwing was a 1956 series of nuclear weapons tests.[20] This error began with the publication of the book Lone Survivor: The Eyewitness Account of Operation Redwing and the Lost Heroes of SEAL Team 10, which was written by Patrick Robinson based on unrecorded interviews with Marcus Luttrell.[3][11][12][21][22]

2/3 eventually abandoned this naming convention out of sensitivity to the local population, instead opting for using Dari names for animals,[2] including Pil. (elephant)[23] and Sorkh Khar (red donkey)[24]
Planning stages and intelligence gathering
A map of the area and plan relating to Operation Red Wings

2/3's battalion staff immediately began planning Operation Red Wings as soon as they arrived in Afghanistan. Lieutenant Colonel Andrew MacMannis, 2/3's battalion commander, and his staff, wanted to maintain the operational tempo set by 3/3. 2/3's Operations Officer, Major Thomas Wood, began planning Red Wings off the Stars base, which was a five phase operation. During this time, 2/3's Intelligence Officer, Captain Scott Westerfield, focused further on learning about Ahmad Shah. His overall intelligence picture of Shah took a substantial leap when 2nd Lieutenant Regan Turner, a platoon commander with 2/3's "Whiskey Company" – a Weapons Company augmented to function like an infantry line company, gathered a wealth of human intelligence about Shah during a patrol, including his full name: Ahmad Shah Dara-I-nur (Ahmad Shah of the Valley of the Enlightened ones); his birthplace, the Kuz Kunar District of Nangarhar Province; his primary alias: Ismael; his chief allegiance: Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, who was based out of the Shamshatoo Refugee Camp near Peshawar, Pakistan; his team's size: fifty to one hundred fighters; and his aspirations: to impede the upcoming elections and attempt to aid a resurgent Taliban in the region. Although Shah was a relatively unknown entity in the region, he apparently held regional aspirations and possibly had the assistance of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. 2nd Lieutenant Turner also gathered a number of photographs of Shah.[2][25][26][27][28]

Further intelligence, including human intelligence and signals intelligence indicated that Shah based his insurgent / terrorist operations out of some small structures outside of the village of Chichal, high on the slopes of Sawtalo Sar mountain in the upper Korangal Valley, approximately 20 miles to the west of Kunar's provincial capital, Asadabad. Using imagery Intelligence, taken from a UAV on June 17, 2005, Westerfield identified likely structures used for housing his team, IED making, and overwatch of the area below, for IED strikes. The intelligence staff identified four Named Areas of Interest, or NAIs containing specific structures which Shah might be using.[2][4] These Named Areas of Interest and specific buildings were determined by analyzing and processing a number of instances of a variety of intelligence, including signals intelligence, human Intelligence, and imagery Intelligence.[2] Westerfield and his staff determined that Shah and his men had been responsible for approximately 11 incidents against American, Coalition, and Government of Afghanistan entities, including IED strikes and small arms ambushes. They determined that Shah and his men would be occupying the area of Chichal in late June, a time of low lunar illumination. The operation would require a helicopter insert of forces to cordon the area and search for Shah and his men, and they sought to conduct this operation at night, after positive identification of Shah by a Marine Corps Scout / Sniper team, which would walk into the area under cover of darkness some nights before.[2]

As with 3/3 before them, 2/3 sought to use Special Operations Forces assets for Red Wings, but unlike 3/3, they sought only the use of Special Operations Aviation assets, specifically, MH-47 Special Operations Aircraft of the Army Special Operations Command's 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (Airborne) (SOAR(A)), and not ground forces. The command from which 2/3's planners requested this, however, CJSOTF-A, or Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force – Afghanistan, refused this request, stating that in order for Red Wings to be supported with Special Operations aviation, the battalion would have to task the opening phases of the operation to Special Operations Ground Forces for the opening phases of the operation, with Marines of 2/3 acting in a supporting role. After the initial phases of Red Wings, then 2/3 could be considered the lead, supported element. The battalion agreed to this, realizing, however, that this unconventional command structure defied a fundamental tenet of successful military operations – "unity of command".[1][13] The operation was presented to a number of Special Operations units working in the area for possible "buy in." U.S. Navy SEALs from SEAL Team 10 and SEAL Delivery Vehicle Team 1 expressed interest.[1][2]
Execution of the operation

Red Wings was planned as a five phase operation:

    Phase 1: Shaping: A U.S. Navy SEAL reconnaissance and surveillance team is tasked to insert in the region of the suspected safe buildings of Ahmad Shah, observe and identify Shah and his men and specific locations, and guide a direct action team of phase two to structures in which Shah and his men are observed to be staying.
    Phase 2: Action on the Objective: A SEAL direct action team is to insert by MH-47, followed shortly by Marines, to capture or kill Shah and his men.
    Phase 3: Outer Cordon: Marines, along with Afghan National Army soldiers, are to sweep surrounding valleys for other suspected insurgents.
    Phase 4: Security and Stabilization: In the days after the first three phases, Marines and Afghan National Army soldiers and Navy Corpsmen will provide medical care to the local population and determine local needs, such as improved roads, wells, and schools.
    Phase 5: Exfiltration: Depending on enemy activity, the Marines will remain in the area for up to one month, then depart the area.

While the Marines planned the overall operation, the SEALs planned the specifics of their roles of Red Wings.[2][7]
Insertion of SEAL team, compromise, and ambush

Late in the night of June 27, 2005, two MH-47 Special Operations Aircraft of the Army Special Operations Command's 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (Airborne) (SOAR(A)) approached Sawtalo Sar. As one of the aircraft performed a number of "decoy drops" to confuse any possible enemy on the ground as to the specific purpose of helicopters, the other inserted, via fastrope, a four-man Navy SEAL reconnaissance and surveillance team in a saddle between Sawtalo Sar and Gatigal Sar, a peak just to the south of Sawtalo Sar. The insert point was roughly one and one half miles from the nearest Named Area of Interest.[4] The team members were team leader Navy Lieutenant Michael P. Murphy of SEAL Delivery Vehicle Team 1 (SDVT-1), based out of Pearl Harbor, Hawaii; Petty Officer Second Class Danny P. Dietz from SEAL Delivery Vehicle Team 2 (SDVT-2), based out of Virginia Beach, Virginia; Petty Officer Second Class Matthew G. Axelson from SEAL Delivery Vehicle Team 1 (SDVT-1); and Navy Hospital Corpsman Second Class Marcus Luttrell, of SEAL Delivery Vehicle Team 1 (SDVT-1).[2][4] After moving to a pre-determined, covered overwatch position, from which the SEALs could observe the Named Areas of Interest, the team was discovered by local goatherds. After determining that they were civilians, and not combatants, Lieutenant Murphy had them released, according to rules of engagement.[2][29]

The team, surmising that they would likely be compromised, retreated to a fallback position. Within an hour, the SEAL Reconnaissance and Surveillance team was ambushed by Shah and his men. The SEALs were attacked by RPK light machine guns, AK-47s, RPG-7 Rocket Propelled Grenades, and 82mm mortars.[2][3] The intensity of the incoming fire, combined with the type of ambush forced the SEAL team into the northeast gulch of Sawtalo Sar, on the Shuryek Valley side of Sawtalo Sar.[2][3][4] The SEALs made a number of attempts to contact their combat operations center with a multi-band radio and then with a satellite phone.[2] The team could not establish consistent communication, other than for a period long enough to indicate that they were under attack.[3] Three of the four team members were killed, and the only survivor, Marcus Luttrell, was left unconscious with a number of fractures and other serious wounds. He regained consciousness and was rescued by local Pashtun, who ultimately saved his life, as in his condition, without assistance, he would surely have been killed or captured by the Taliban.[6][30][31][32]
Red Wings II: quick reaction force, search, rescue, recovery, and presence operations

With the communication that the SEAL reconnaissance and surveillance team was ambushed, the focus of the operation immediately shifted from disrupting ACM activity to finding, aiding, and extracting the SEALs of the reconnaissance and surveillance team. The operation was now known as Operation Red Wings II.[1]

After the broken transmission from the SEAL reconnaissance and surveillance team, the position and situation of the SEALs became unknown. Members of SEAL Team 10, U.S. Marines, and aviators of the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment were prepared to dispatch a quick reaction force, but command for launch from higher special operations headquarters was delayed for a number of hours. A quick reaction force finally launched, consisting of two MH-47 Special Operations Aircraft of the 160th, two UH-60 conventional Army aviation Black Hawk helicopters, and two AH-64 Apache attack helicopters. The two MH-47s took the lead. Upon reaching Sawtalo Sar, the two MH-47s received small arms fire. During an attempt to insert SEALs who were riding in one of the MH-47 helicopters, one of Ahmad Shah's men fired an RPG-7 rocket propelled grenade, which struck the transmission below the rear rotor assembly, causing the aircraft to immediately plummet to the ground, killing all eight 160th Army Special Operations Aviators and crew, and all eight Navy SEALs who were passengers. Both commanders of the 160th, Ground commander LCDR Erik S. Kristensen, of SEAL Team 10, and aviation element commander Major Stephen C. Reich, were killed in the shootdown. Command and control (C2) at this point was lost, and neither visual nor radio contact could be established with the SEAL reconnaissance and surveillance team. At this point, which was late in the afternoon, storm clouds were moving in over the region. The aircraft returned to their respective bases, and a massive search began, at first from the ground, and then with aviation assets. The 16 bodies of those killed in the MH-47 shootdown were recovered. After an intensive search, the bodies of Dietz, Murphy, and Axelson were eventually recovered, and Marcus Luttrell was rescued, his survival due in part to the aid of a local Afghan villager in the village of Salar Ban, roughly 0.7 miles down the Northeast Gulch of Sawtalo Sar[4] from the location of the ambush.[1][2]
Afghans who aided Luttrell

In the years following Operation Red Wings more details emerged about the circumstances surrounding Luttrell being given sanctuary by local villagers and the aftermath. Many of the details regarding the Afghans who aided Luttrell were reported incorrectly in the American press during the days after the events occurred.[33]

The SEALs firefight with Ahmad Shah's Taliban forces began along a high-elevation ridgeline called Sawtalo Sar.[34] (The highest peak of this ridgeline is 2830 meters (9,282 feet).[35] A descent down the west side of the ridgeline leads into the Shuryek valley. The northeastern gulch in which the SEALs became trapped was in this direction, above the village of Salar Ban. To the east of the Sawtalo Sar ridgeline is the Korangal valley. As the wounded Luttrell descended the gulch, he encountered a Pashtun named Mohammad Gulab Khan from the mountain village of Salar Ban.[36] Known simply as Gulab, he took Luttrell into his home that first day and evoked the assistance of others from his village to protect Luttrell until American forces could be contacted. This was in accordance with the cultural tradition of Pashtunwali, whereby asylum (Nanawatai) is offered to a person to protect them from their enemies.

It is likely Luttrell would have been turned over to the Taliban had he descended into the Korangal instead of Shuryek.[37] While the villagers of the Shuryek valley weren't considered overly friendly to American forces they were nonetheless less hostile than villagers in the nearby mountainous Chichal (part of neighboring Korangal), with whom the Shuryek villagers have been traditionally been at odds over grazing-land boundaries.

Not long before Operation Red Wings had occurred, relations with the Americans had improved in the Shuryek Valley and the greater Pech river region because of humanitarian work that had been occurring. Medical services had been extended, and a girls school was built at Nangalam.[37] Gulab was aware of these developments and had introduced himself to the Marine commander at Nangalam, Matt Bartels, when he was visiting Matin.[38] It was within this context that Gulab stumbled upon Luttrell and gave him sanctuary.[39] The Taliban leader, Ahmad Shah, knew that the wounded soldier that he was tracking had to pass through the village of Salar Ban as he contoured downhill. Through intimidation Shah was able to ascertain which house sheltered the wounded soldier and demanded that he be turned over. But Shah couldn't risk a fight at that moment because he was outnumbered and other relatives and villagers would come to Gulab's aid. Luttrell was subsequently moved to different places until forces could arrive to extract him.

Luttrell wrote a note and asked that it be taken to the American base at Asadabad. Because Gulab had previously met the Marine commander based at Nangalam, he asked an older man named Shina, of another part of the village of Salar Ban, to make the trek with the note to that base instead.[36] This required a longer journey down the trails of the Shuryek valley to Matin, where he then hired a cab to drive the Pech road to Nangalam.[40] Gulab gave Shina 1000 Afghanis (about twenty U.S. dollars). When Shina reached the base in Nangalam in the middle of the night he met with the commander and related the story about a wounded American soldier in their village. He then gave him the note that Luttrell had written.[41]

In the weeks following Marcus Luttrell's rescue, Gulab and his family received threats from the Taliban and they were relocated to Asadabad.[33]
American casualties
Michael P. Murphy, Lt US Navy, Medal of Honor Recipient.
Army plaque in memory of the fallen Night Stalkers
Name    Age    Action    Hometown
Navy SEALs
LT Michael P. Murphy    29    Part of 4-Man SEAL team, killed in an ambush    Patchogue, New York
SO2 Matthew Axelson    29    Cupertino, California[42]
SO2 Danny Dietz    25    Littleton, Colorado[42]
SOC Jacques J. Fontan    36    Killed aboard the helicopter when it was shot down    New Orleans, Louisiana
SOCS Daniel R. Healy    36    Exeter, New Hampshire
LCDR Erik S. Kristensen    33    San Diego, California
SO1 Jeffery A. Lucas    33    Corbett, Oregon
LT Michael M. McGreevy, Jr.    30    Portville, New York
SO2 James E. Suh    28    Deerfield Beach, Florida
SO1 Jeffrey S. Taylor    30    Midway, West Virginia
SO2 Shane E. Patton    22    Boulder City, Nevada
160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment[9]
SSG Shamus O. Goare    29    Killed aboard the helicopter when it was shot down    Danville, Ohio
CWO3 Corey J. Goodnature    35    Clarks Grove, Minnesota.
SGT Kip A. Jacoby    21    Pompano Beach, Florida
SFC Marcus V. Muralles    33    Shelbyville, Indiana
MSG James W. Ponder III    36    Franklin, Tennessee
MAJ Stephen C. Reich    34    Washington Depot, Connecticut.
SFC Michael L. Russell    31    Stafford, Virginia
CWO4 Chris J. Scherkenbach    40    Jacksonville, Florida
Aftermath and repercussions

Ahmad Shah and his group recovered a large amount of weapons, ammunition, and other materials, including three SOPMOD M4 Carbines fitted with M203 40mm grenade launchers, a ruggedized laptop with an intact hard drive containing maps of embassies in Kabul, night vision equipment, and a sniper spotting scope, among other items from the Navy SEAL reconnaissance and surveillance team, items which they could then use against American, Coalition, and Government of Afghanistan entities. Shah had with him two videographers during the ambush, and As-Sahab Media released a video of the ambush and the items recovered from the SEALs.

A large amount of resources were devoted to the search, rescue, and recovery operations of Red Wings II. As such, Ahmad Shah and his men left the region and regrouped in Pakistan. During the following weeks of Red Wings II, ground units of 2/3 undertook a number of patrols, as did members of the Afghan National Army, Army Special Operations units, and Navy Special Operations units. These "presence operations" achieved the goal of disrupting anti-coalition militia activity, but at great cost, and upon the exfiltration of troops, Ahmad Shah and his reinforced cell was able to return to the area weeks later.[2]

A tremendous amount of global media attention was focused on the ambush and the MH-47 shootdown. The size of Shah's group increased as additional fighters joined his ranks. With the withdrawal of American and Coalition troops at the end of Red Wings II, Shah and his group was able to return to the Kunar Province and begin attacks again. The "sequel" to Operation Red Wings was Operation Whalers, which 2/3 planned and executed in August 2005.[2][3] Some survivors have suffered from PTSD.[43]
Notable later events
Military decorations and honors

On September 14, 2006, Dietz and Axelson were posthumously awarded the Navy Cross for "undaunted courage" and heroism. Luttrell was also awarded the Navy Cross in a ceremony at the White House. In 2007, Murphy was posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor for his actions during the battle.

On June 28, 2008, Luttrell and the family members of soldiers killed overseas were honored at a San Diego Padres game.[44] In addition, the United States Navy Parachute Team, the Leap Frogs, brought in the American flag, the POW/MIA flag and the San Diego Padres flag. The attendees were given a standing ovation by the more than 25,000 there to watch the game.

A statue entitled The Guardians stands in the Cupertino Veterans Memorial Park, in Cupertino, California. The statue depicts both Matthew Axelson and James Suh, natives of the region, standing back-to-back.[45]
Ahmad Shah

Shah's group in Kunar Province was neutralized and Shah was seriously wounded during Operation Whalers weeks later in August 2005.[1][2][7]

In April 2008, Shah was killed during a shootout with Pakistani police in the Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa.[46]
Disputed information

There exists some conflict over the exact numbers of Taliban forces involved in the engagement, among other mistakes by some sources. In Luttrell's own official after-action report filed with his superiors after his rescue, he estimated the size of the Taliban force to be around 20–35. Luttrell claims in his book that during the briefing his team was told around 80 to 200 fighters were expected to be in the area.[6] Initial intel estimates estimated approximately 10 to 20.[3] Official media reports from the military estimated the size of the Taliban force to be around 20 as well, while in the Medal of Honor citation for LT Michael P. Murphy, the Navy cited 30–40 enemies.[47] In the Summary of Action related to the same MOH, the Navy cites an "enemy force of more than 50 anti-coalition militia".[48] In his book, Victory Point: Operations Red Wings and Whalers – the Marine Corps' Battle for Freedom in Afghanistan, military journalist Ed Darack cites a military intelligence report stating the strength of the Taliban force to be 8–10, compared to the more than 200 claimed by Patrick Robinson in Lone Survivor. The military intelligence estimate cited by Darack is based on research sourced from intelligence reports, including aerial and eye-witness studies of the battlefield after the fact, including the men sent in to rescue Luttrell, as well as reports from Afghan intelligence.[3][11][12]

The claim in Lone Survivor by Patrick Robinson that Lieutenant Murphy even considered and then put to vote the possible execution of the unarmed civilians who stumbled upon the SEAL reconnaissance and surveillance team has been roundly criticized and dismissed by many as fiction. In an article by Sean Naylor, Army Times senior correspondent, Navy Special Warfare Command spokesman Lieutenant Steve Ruh stated that with respect to making command decisions in the field, "Whether they’re officer or enlisted, the senior guy ultimately has the ultimate authority." And with regards to voting whether or not to execute unarmed civilians, he admitted, "This is the first time I’ve ever heard of anything put to a vote like that. In my 14 years of Navy experience, I’ve never seen or heard of anything like that."[32]

In the June 12, 2007 article "Survivor's book dishonors son's memory" by Michael Rothfeld in Newsday, Michael P. Murphy's father Dan claims that Lieutenant Murphy would never have considered executing unarmed civilians, let alone putting such a grave decision up for a vote (in reference to the purported vote of execution of unarmed locals). Military protocol, United States and international military doctrine, and rules of engagement strictly forbid harming unarmed non-combatant civilians, with one of the specific rules of engagement in effect at the time stating, "Civilians are not targets!"[29][49][50]

Operation Whalers finalizare la Red Wings (lol).


D13-th_Mytzu

  • Senil Chef'
  • Administrator
  • Posts: 13255
Re: Filmari si povesti real ops
« Reply #3 on: February 25, 2014, 10:26:12 pm »
Batalia de la Malaja Belosjorka sep 25th 1941

http://www.worldwar2.ro/forum/index.php?showtopic=5626&st=0
Quote
The Romanian Mountain Corps replaced the German 49th Alpine Corps on the front in the Nogayisk Steppe during the nights of 23/24 and 24/25 September. On the Northern flank was the 4th Mountain Brigade, which had its left flank on the Dnepr's Bend at Balki. In the middle was the 2nd Mountain Brigade of brig. gen. Ioan Dumitrache, which was defending the villages of Malaya Byelozherka and Ulyanovka. The right flank and the link with the German 30th Corps was secured by the 1st Mountain Brigade of brig. gen. Mihail Lascar, the future Oak Leaves Ritterkreuz recipient and then, ironically, commander of the Soviet sponsored HCC Division. This brigade was positioned by the AT ditch near Timoshevka. To the South of the Mountain Corps the divisions of the German 30th Corps were interleaved with the Romanian Cavalry brigades. Thus, linked up with the 1st Mountain Brigade was the German 170th Infantry Division, positioned around Veseloe. On its right flank was the German 72nd Infantry Division, which had entered Chisinau together with the 1st Armored Division two months before. The 5th Cavalry Brigade held the extreme right flank all the way to the Azov Sea. The Romanian 6th and 8th Cavalry Brigades were held in reserve at Ivanovka, behind the German 30th Corps.

In front of the Romanian Mountain Corps and of the German 170th Infantry Division was the Soviet 18th Army. It had deployed from the Dnepr in the North to the South the following units: 164th, 130th, 96th and the 270th Rifle Divisions. The 4th Rifle Division was held in reserve in the second echelon. For support, it had the 2nd, 7th and 15th Tank Brigades, the 266th, 394th, 267th and 437th Artillery Regiments and the 4th Antitank Brigade. The 9th Soviet Army was deployed in the sector of Melitopol in front of the rest of the German 30th Corps and of the Romanian cavalry. From the link with the 18th Army to the Azov Sea, the Soviets had deployed the 30th, 176th, 150th, 218th and 296th Rifle Divisions. The 136th Rifle Division was in reserve near Melitopol and the 30th Cavalry Division near Bogdanovka. For support, the 9th Army had only one brigade from the 8th Tank Division and the 521st Artillery Regiment. The 18th Army was weaker in infantry, but had more tanks and corps artillery, thus could theoretically deliver a stronger punch than the 9th Army could. The aim of the two Soviet armies was to brake through the Axis front and threaten the flank of the bulk of the German 11th Army fighting in the Perekop Isthmus, thus easing the pressure on the Soviet 51st Army in Crimea.

The offensive began on 25 September after a strong bombardment, while the Axis line was still organizing. The Soviets had the benefit of a large AT ditch in front of the Romanian Mountain Corps, which they effectively used to prepare the infantry assaults. The 164th Rifle Division and regiments from the 96th and 4th Rifle Divisions managed to advance 1.5 km near the Dnepr in the sector of the 4th Mountain Brigade, which had to wheel South its left flank. On the front of the 1st and 2nd Mountain Brigades, the 130th Rifle Division and elements of the 96th Rifle Division carried out six attacks. Five were successfully repulsed. The sixth was directed against a bulge in the Axis line in the village of Ulianovka, where the 15th Mountain Battalion was stationed. It had already repulsed a Soviet incursion the previous day, but the assault was renewed with two or three battalions supported by 16 tanks and heavy artillery. The 15th Battalion was surrounded inside the village and was resisting. The 3rd Company of the 16th Mountain Battalion counterattacked around 1600 hours from the nearby town of Malaya Belozherka and reestablished the link, but eventually it was itself forced to retreat after it had lost around half of its men. The 15th Mountain Battalion managed to brake through the encirclement during the evening and retreated to Malaya Belozherka on the right flank of the 16th Battalion.

On 26 September, the 9th and 16th Mountain Battalions of the 2nd Mountain Brigade attempted to recapture Ulianovka. When the vânători were bogged down in street fighting, the enemy counterattacked the 9th Battalion and forced it to pull back towards Malaya Belozherka. Having its right flank uncovered, the 16th Battalion also pulled back. In the sector of the 4th Mountain Brigade, the 164th Rifle Division attacked at the junction with the 2nd Mountain Brigade, but was repulsed. During the night, the 8th Cavalry Brigade was inserted between the German 170th and 72nd Infantry Divisions, freeing up troops from the former.

The following day the fighting climaxed around Malaya Belozherka. With the support of tanks and powerful artillery and air bombardments, the 130th Rifle Division together with elements of the 4th and 96th Rifle Divisions attacked the town held by the 2nd Mountain Brigade. Around 1100 hours, the Soviets had breached the line between the 16th and 10th Mountain Battalions and had encircled the latter's left flank and then the entire unit. However, it continued to resist fiercely against the Soviet infantry and armor in the streets of Malaya Belozherka, waiting for the reserves to counterattack and relieve them. The command point of the 7th Mountain Group was as well encircled and had to use all available personnel to escape. Enemy spearheads had reached the positions of the 2nd Mountain Artillery Group, which had to fight hard to repulse them. The brigade was in no position to assist the 10th Battalion, because tanks had also encircled its command point. The 17th and 20th Mountain Battalions from the 4th Mountain Brigade, which had pulled back and were in the vicinity, intervened and repulsed them. The 20th Battalion was then directed to Malaya Belozherka. It counterattacked in the evening and managed to shortly regain the lost ground. The Soviets also brought in reinforcements, including tanks, and eventually took the town driving back the 2nd Mountain Brigade. The front stabilized 800 m South of Malaya Belozherka. The 10th Mountain Battalion had lost 20 officers, including the commander lt. col. Emanoil Bradateanu, and around 400 soldiers. The remaining men managed to brake through the encirclement and join the brigade. Brig. gen. Dumitrache estimated that the resistance put up by this battalion had saved the others from certain encirclement.

The 4th Mountain Brigade was also attacked on the entire front by the Soviet 164th Rifle Division supported by 40 tanks, heavy artillery and aircraft. The initial attacks were repulsed, but eventually the mountain troops were forced to pull back. The 13th and 14th Mountain Battalions were surrounded, but they managed to brake free and rejoin the brigade's forces on the new line, which was to the South near Bolshe Belozherka. The left flank of the 2nd Mountain Brigade was thus left open. Soviet tanks entered through the gap and reached the supply columns and the command point. As we have seen, the 20th Mountain Battalion intervened to help the 2nd Brigade, after it had retreated to the new line. At the end of the day, the 2nd Brigade had pulled back its open flank and reestablished the connection with the 4th Brigade. The tanks, which lacked infantry support, were eventually eliminated or retreated, but 60% of the brigade's AT guns had been lost in the fight against them. On the right flank of the 2nd Brigade and in the sector of the 1st Mountain Brigade all attacks were repulsed.

Because of the dangerous situation developing on the left flank of the front, the German 11th Army stopped the offensive in the Perekop Isthmus and directed the 49th Alpine Corps to that area. The 170th Infantry Division had redeployed the 401st Grenadier Regiment behind the 2nd Mountain Brigade after it had been made available by the insertion of the 8th Cavalry Brigade into the front. German artillery had also been deployed to support the Romanian mountain troops.

On 28 September, the Soviets mounted a new powerful assault on the 2nd Brigade's right flank, where the 8th and 7th Battalions had resisted the previous days, but it was again repulsed with the help of the German artillery. Around 0800 hors, the 401st Grenadier Regiment, the 2nd Calarasi Regiment (from the 8th Cavalry Brigade) and the 20th Mountain Battalion attacked the Northwestern corner of Malaya Belozherka and managed to take it after an hour of fighting. In the afternoon, the Soviets counterattacked the troops inside the town and drove out all of them, with the exception of the 20th Mountain Battalion that held out in the Southern part. The assault was in fact carried out on a broader front, including the right flank of the 2nd Brigade, where tanks were also used. The majority of the remaining AT guns was concentrated there, because it was basically an opened field. They managed to take out most of the Soviet armor and the infantry was repulsed. To the South, the Soviets occupied Levitskoe in the sector of the 170th Division.

On 29 September, the daily air bombardment to which the Romanian and German troops were constantly subjected to was interrupted by the intervention of the 8th Fliegerkorps that had also stopped operations in the Perekop Isthmus and had been redirected to the endangered sector. The Soviets attacked again the entire front of the 2nd Mountain Brigade after an artillery preparation that lasted for two hours. On the left flank, tanks passed through the junction between the 7th and 8th Mountain Battalions, as well as through the junction between the 7th and 23rd Mountain Battalions (the latter was part of the 1st Mountain Brigade). In the sector of the 3rd Company/7th Mountain Battalion, the only existing AT gun took out two of the three tanks. The armor was however unsupported by infantry, because the mountain troops were holding their positions and the Soviet riflemen were repulsed wave after wave. The tanks roamed around the back of the first line units and even reached the brigade's command point were they massacred the wounded they found in the field infirmary. German tank hunters and a Romanian motorized cavalry squadron towing AT guns with their trucks eventually destroyed them or drove them back to their own lines. On the left flank of the 2nd Mountain Brigade, the Soviets broke through the junction between the 9th and 16th Mountain Battalions and advanced to the positions of the 2nd Mountain Howitzer Battalion. The artillerymen counterattacked with grenades and repulsed the enemy spearhead.

The German 49th Alpine Corps began its offensive along the Dnepr and the following day, on 30 September, it had restored the initial line of the front. The 4th Mountain Brigade regrouped behind the Romanian Mountain Corps. The Soviets made two assaults in the sector of the 1st Mountain Brigade, but both were repulsed. Similarly, on the front of the 2nd Brigade, the Soviets attacked at noon, but the infantry was scattered by the German artillery. In the evening, assaults were carried out on both flanks. Only on the right, at the 8th Battalion, did the Soviets managed to advance a little, before the counterattack, again with the support of the German artillery, drove them back.

The offensive of the 18th Army in the Northern sector had ceased. The 2nd Mountain Brigade had lost 1,538 men (killed, wounded and missing) during the operations, being the most affected of all three brigades.

During the following days, the Soviets attempted a breakthrough to the South, in the area of the 8th Cavalry Brigade, but the Liebstandarte Adolf Hitler SS Division restored the front. As the 1st Panzer Group swept down from the North to cut off the two Soviet armies, the German and Romanian forces completed the encirclement.

D13-th_Mytzu

  • Senil Chef'
  • Administrator
  • Posts: 13255
Re: Filmari si povesti real ops
« Reply #4 on: March 25, 2014, 09:42:21 pm »
Cateva misiuni ale 101st Airborne in cadrul operatiunii Dragon Strike - sunt niste chestii interesante:

Quote
Operation Dragon Strike, the massive operation led by the 101st Airborne Division's Strike Brigade and conducted in Kandahar, Afghanistan during Operation Enduring Freedom 10-11, breaks the back of Taliban in their homeland.
The Strike Brigade was selected by President Barrack Obama and Gen. David Petraeus to conduct this historical mission and recently awarded a military units highest honor, The Presidential Unit Citation Award.
These are some of the stories and their 'on the battlefield' videos from the Strike OEF 10-11 Soldiers.


D13-th_Mytzu

  • Senil Chef'
  • Administrator
  • Posts: 13255
Re: Filmari si povesti real ops
« Reply #5 on: March 26, 2014, 09:41:12 am »
Pathfinders: Into The Heart of Afghanistan - interesant


mytzu

  • el ninio
  • Posts: 1564
Re: Filmari si povesti real ops
« Reply #6 on: August 22, 2014, 12:23:22 pm »
Lost Platoon


mytzu

  • el ninio
  • Posts: 1564
Re: Filmari si povesti real ops
« Reply #7 on: May 19, 2015, 09:00:13 am »
http://www.flux24.ro/100-de-ostasi-romani-vs-3000-de-militari-sovietici-un-mort-si-doi-raniti-la-peste-350-de-morti-din-armata-rosie-incredibil/

Quote
Caucaz, URSS. Comandamentul superior german a dispus trecerea în defensiva si organizarea în cele mai bune conditii a unei aparari de durata, în vederea iernii care începuse sa se faca simtita. S-a dispus organizarea unei linii continue de aparare, fara intervale între unitati, pentru a se evita infiltrarile în spatele pozitiei de aparare, terenul fiind accidentat si împadurit.

 

Comandamentele au fost organizate la nivel de divizie astfel:

Comandantul Diviziei 3 munte, generalul Leonard Mociulschi avea sub comanda directa Grupul 3 vanatori de munte cu trei batalioane (5, 12, 22) si un divizion tunuri de munte si Regimentul 57 infanterie germana cu artileria respectiva.
Comandantul Diviziei 9 infanterie germana, generalul Schleinitz comanda direct Grupul 6 vanatori de munte cu trei batalioane (6, 11, 21), un divizion tunuri munte si Regimentul 116 infanterie germana cu artileria respectiva.
Batalionul 6 avea o pozitie de aparare pe un front de 4 000 m, avand în linie companiile I, II, III si de cercetare. Compania mea de cercetare se gasea la flancul stang al batalionului cu cele trei plutoane în linie, din care retinusem ca rezerva o grupa de zece oameni si facea legatura, prin plutonul 2, cu Regimentul 116 infanterie germana. Acesta din urma, comandat de locotenent-colonelul Welsser, avea de aparat un front de 1 000 m, care datorita configuratiei terenului era mult avansat fata de compania I din dreapta mea. Pe acest front am organizat si construit 30 cazemate din lemn si pamant. Fiecare cazemata avea trei ambrazuri si era ocupata de doi-trei luptatori, iar în exteriorul cazematei erau facute gropile circulare în picioare, pentru a fi folosite la nevoie contra tancurilor.

 

În fata pozitiei am construit obstacole din retea de sarma joasa, abatise din lemn si în unele locuri campuri de mine antiinfanterie.

 

Decembrie, 1942. Iarna începuse cu zapada si viscole, pozitia de aparare a batalionului si, respectiv, a companiei mele era complet terminata si gata de a primi lupta. Toate cazematele construite aveau cate o placuta cu denumirea ei, respectiv un nume cu rezonanta istorica: ROVINE, PODUL ÎNALT, CĂLUGĂRENI, GRIVITA, PLEVNA, OITUZ, MĂRĂŞEŞTI, PE AICI NU SE TRECE etc. Comandantul Diviziei 9 infanterie germana, împreuna cu locotenent-colonelul Ion Mardarescu, comandantul Batalionului 6 vanatori de munte si maiorul Ion Petreanu, ajutorul comandantului de batalion, au inspectat întreaga pozitie de aparare a Batalionului 6 si au ramas foarte multumiti de ceea ce au vazut, iar comandantul Regimentului 116 infanterie germana, locotenent-colonelul Welsser, venit la legatura cu batalionul, m-a felicitat vazand pozitia de aparare a companiei cercetare si a dispus ca unitatea germana ce se învecina la dreapta cu compania mea sa pastreze o legatura permanenta cu mine prin agent si telefon. În toata aceasta perioada de oarecare acalmie cat a durat organizarea pozitiei de aparare, se facea zilnic cercetarea terenului în fata pozitiei înspre satul Şapsugskaia, unde se simtea o foarte febrila activitate a inamicului, începandu-se concentrarea fortelor în vederea ofensivelor de iarna, despre care fusesem informati ca vor urma. Deasupra pozitiilor noastre se aruncau din avioanele rusesti afise scrise în limba romana, semnate de generalul roman Romulus Dimitiriu care cazuse prizonier în încercuirea de la Stalingrad, afise în care se spunea "Ofiteri romani din Caucaz, predati-va! Soarta voastra este pecetluita. Un nou Stalingrad va asteapta".

 

Într-adevar, în acest spatiu caucazian cuprins între muntii Caucaz la sud, Marea Caspica la est si Marea de Azov la vest, exista o grupare de forte armate germano-romane, formata din Armata 17 germana, comandata de generalul Ervin Janecke si sase divizii romane (10 si 19 infanterie, 5 si 6 cavalerie, 2 si 3 munte). Dintre aceste ultime divizii cea mai îndepartata era Divizia 2 munte, în zona orasului Nalcik, iar Divizia 3 munte se afla în zona Krimskaia-Abinskaia-Şapsugskaia, între ele existand o distanta de 500 km.

 

13 decembrie. Organizez o patrula puternica de 15 schiori din compania mea care, sub comanda sergentului major Iacob Budau, executa o sonda adanca înspre inamic, ajungand la marginea satului Şapsugskaia, în pozitiile artileriei si face prizonier un subofiter. Informatiile aduse de patrula sergentului major au fost foarte pretioase în vederea viitoarelor operatiuni din iarna anului 1943. Incursiunile si patrularile la inamic continua. Orice schimbare de trupe la inamic, deplasari de trupe dintr-o parte în alta sunt cunoscute la timp de batalion si raportate esalonului superior, respectiv Diviziei 9 infanterie germana. Toate patrulele trimise de compania cercetare confirma marea concentrare de forte în zona satului Şapsugskaia, respectiv forte de infanterie, artilerie si tancuri.

6 ianuarie, 1943. Compania germana din Regimentul 116 german din stanga mea (comandant sublocotenentul Rosenkranz) este înlocuita de escadronul de cavalerie al Diviziei 9 infanterie germana, comandat de locotenentul Brendeke. Camarazii germani vin sa-si ia la revedere de la mine, iar noul comandant tine sa-mi spuna ca va pastra o buna legatura cu mine si vom colabora tot asa de bine cum au facut-o si cei pe care i-a înlocuit.

 

10 ianuarie 1943. Domnul maior Petreanu, înlocuitorul la comanda batalionului (prin plecarea în concediu de odihna a domnului locotenent-colonel Mardarescu), ne comunica telefonic informatia primita de la comandantul Diviziei 9 infanterie germana ca "Marea ofensiva ruseasca este iminenta". Patrula trimisa de mine în dupa amiaza zilei se înapoiaza si raporteaza ca forte puternice si pe front larg afluiesc spre pozitia companiei si a batalionului.

 

12 ianuarie. Patrulele trimise în zorii zilei raporteaza ca fortele inamice se instaleaza pe baza de plecare la atac pe întregul front al batalionului. Trec pe la fiecare cazemata si îmbarbatez luptatorii. La ora 9.00, aviatia inamica bombardeaza si mitraliaza pozitia de aparare a batalionului. La ora 9.30 începe pregatirea de artilerie. Se trage cu tunuri si obuziere de toate calibrele, cu katiuse si aruncatoare. Bombardamentul dureaza mai mult de o ora si cu aceeasi intensitate pe tot frontul batalionului: la flancul drept, compania a II-a (sublocotenent în rezerva Victor Botocan), la centru compania locotenentului Lucian Ionescu si la flancul stang compania de cercetare a sublocotenentului Constantin Nicolescu. Bombardamentul a fost infernal, dar fara urmari serioase întrucat cazematele raman intacte. Un obuz de 150 mm a cazut direct pe cazemata Pe aici nu se trece, dar aceasta a rezistat, iar placuta cu denumirea ei am gasit-o ulterior azvarlita la 50 m de cazemata. Vanatorii stau în cazematele lor cu degetul pe tragaciul armelor si asteapta asaltul infanteriei inamice. Artileria noastra de munte executa trageri precise de oprire la numai 150-200 m în fata pozitiei în contrapanta, unde infanteria ruseasca este gata de atac. Dupa ultimele lovituri ale artileriei inamice, valuri de atacatori cu baionetele puse la arme si turmentati de bautura navalesc asupra pozitiei companiei mele si pe întregul front al batalionului. Armele automate - pusti-mitraliere, mitraliere, pistoale-mitraliere - deschid un foc ucigator, campul de tragere limitandu-se la circa 100 m (terenul fiind accidentat). Bolsevicii cad trasniti de gloantele vanatorilor din cazemate. La legatura dintre compania mea si compania I, din dreapta mea, au aparut cinci tancuri, dar tunul le-a distrus pe toate în fata pozitiei. Rusii au venit puhoi, dar putini au mai plecat înapoi. Lupta dureaza pana la caderea serii. Rusii se retrag spre zona lor de plecare. În fata companiei mele, ca si în fata întregii pozitii a batalionului, raman sute de cadavre inamice drept marturie a vitejiei si darzeniei ostasului roman vanator de munte. Trec pe la fiecare cazemata si felicit pe toti luptatorii si în special pe puscasii mitraliori si mitraliori (sergentii Bondar si Tataru). La caderea întunericului trec pe la fiecare cazemata si împart painea, carnea si tigarile întrucat de azi-noapte de la ora trei nu s-a mancat nimic.

 

13 ianuarie. La ora 2 noaptea vine plutonierul companiei, Ghinghilovschi, cu mancarea calda pe care o împarte tuturor luptatorilor "la locul de munca". Zi de iarna, frig, ger. Dimineata pare linistita, dar activitatea do artilerie si aviatie este intensa.

 

Pe la ora 10.00, dupa o pregatire de artilerie de 50 de minute, infanteria inamica porneste la asalt, efortul atacului îndreptandu-se spre stanga batalionului, la compania mea. Armele automate ale celor trei plutoane si ale grupei de mitraliere si aruncatorul brandt deschid un foc nimicitor, zdrobind orice încercare a inamicului de a se apropia de linia cazematelor. Sergentul major Budau si sergentul Tataru fac minuni de vitejie. La ora 15, sergentul major Budau este omorat de un proiectil de brandt 81 mm, tocmai cand iesea din cazemata. Dispun ca sergentul Tataru sa ia comanda plutonului. Fruntasul Moca cu "branduletul" lui de 60 mm face minuni, punand parca cu mana proiectilele care cad, peste 150-200 m, chiar pe atacatorii care se gasesc în contrapanta si de unde pornesc la asalt. Pe la ora 17, lupta înceteaza pe întregul front al batalionului. Rusii se retrag spre zona lor de concentrare, satul Şapsugskaia.

Pierderi: un mort, sergent major Budau, si doi raniti pe care îi evacuez la batalion.

 

14 ianuarie. Plec cu o echipa pentru a vedea campul de lupta din fata pozitiei companiei. Este un tablou "frumos", mormane de cadavre rusesti, arme de tot felul, munitie de tot felul, masti de gaze. Printre cadavre descopar un maior, doi capitani si un sublocotenent. Numar 50 de cadavre în prima linie din contrapanta. Mai jos nu am fost. Cred ca mai sunt multi, se cunosc urmele pe unde au tarat din morti si raniti. Strang patru pusti mitraliera, cinci pistoale mitraliera, doua pusti anticar, 30 pusti, sapte pusti semiautomate, masti de gaze, unelte diferite si munitiuni de tot felul. Din informatiile luate de la prizonieri, precum si din constatarile facute prin lupta reiese ca inamicul a atacat pozitia de aparare a Batalionului 6 vanatori de munte cu trei batalioane: Batalionul 3 din Brigada 81 marina, batalioanele 1 si 2 din Brigada 103 elevi, fiecare cu cate 900 de oameni, organizate pe sapte companii (trei companii de puscasi, o companie de pistoale mitraliera, o companie de mitraliere, o companie de pusti antitanc si una de aruncatoare). Numai în imediata apropiere a cazematelor s-au numarat 350 de morti din care s-au identificat doi maiori si mai multi ofiteri inferiori. S-au adunat din fata pozitiei batalionului 31 pusti mitraliere, 43 pistoale mitraliera, 13 pusti AT, 9 aruncatoare brandt mari si mici, 3 mitraliere, precum si 250 pusti. Prin rezistenta eroica a Batalionului 6 inamicul nu a reusit sa strapunga pozitia de aparare pentru a-si deschide drum spre Krimskaia si a taia linia de comunicatii Nalcik-Krasnodar-Krimskaia-Taman. Din cand în cand patrule inamice de circa 1 la 2 plutoane, încearca atacul pentru a pipai taria pozitiei noastre de aparare, dar sunt respinse cu pierderi mari pentru ei. Prin megafoane, se anunta premii de zeci de mii de ruble pentru eventualii "dezertori", care sa le dea informatii privind taria fortelor din pozitia noastra de aparare, în vederea unei noi ofensive. Informatiile primite de la esalonul superior german ne spun ca noua ofensiva rusa va fi mult mai puternica si sprijinita de tancuri, iar noi sa ne pregatim si sa refacem gropile circulare anticar pentru a fi folosite la nevoie cand tancurile vor trece la distrugerea cazematelor.

 

26 ianuarie 1943. Începe noua, marea, puternica si adevarata ofensiva ruseasca pe întregul front al Batalionului 6 vanatori de munte, ofensiva însotita de tancuri. La compania mea începe atacul la ora 11, în sectorul plutonului 2, sublocotenent (r) Coroiu Ion, dar fara tancuri, terenul fiind accidentat. Rusii ataca, dar nu reusesc sa treaca peste obstacole, abatize si campul de mine existente în fata pozitiei. Armele automate îsi fac datoria. Atacul începe si pe restul companiei cercetare. Lupta dureaza cu mici întreruperi pana spre seara. Rusii se retrag în contrapanta. La ora 2 noaptea se asalteaza pozitia, dar nu se reuseste nimic. Pierderile rusilor sunt mari. În fata pozitiei începe sa se contureze un "obstacol neobisnuit" prin mortii produsi de armele automate.

 

27 ianuarie. La ora 8 se reia atacul pe întregul front al batalionului. La compania 1, locotenent Ionescu Lucian, la dreapta mea, se ataca cu tancuri. Şase tancuri sunt distruse în fata pozitiei de unicul tun Breda. Toti servantii tunului sunt scosi din lupta. Tancurile reusesc sa patrunda în pozitie, fara infanterie însa, dar se retrag întrucat doua tancuri au fost scoase din lupta de vanatorii de tancuri. La ora 14.30, sublocotenentul Coroiu Ion este ranit foarte grav de un proiectil de artilerie grea. Îl evacuez pe la vecinii din stanga. Brancardierii germani îl duc la primul ajutor si apoi este transportat la spitalul din Krimskaia, unde a decedat. Numesc la comanda plutonului pe sergentul Dan. Nu mai am nici un ofiter si nici un subofiter la comanda plutoanelor, dar compania rezista si-si apara sectorul încredintat. Se apropie seara si lupta înceteaza pentru un timp.

 

28 ianuarie. La ora 1 noaptea începe atacul la compania I din dreapta mea, însotit de tancuri, care reusesc sa patrunda în liniile noastre, sase tancuri ajungand în spatele pozitiei mele. Cer ajutor la vecinii germani din stanga mea; locotenentul Brendeke îmi trimite o companie de pionieri (efective reduse), comandata de locotenentul Formstein. Contraatac cu aceasta companie si restabilesc situatia la compania I, refacand linia de aparare, iar tancurile, trei la numar, sunt distruse de pionieri vanatori de tancuri germani. Compania de pionieri ramane la dispozitia mea, în rezerva.

 

29 ianuarie. La ora 6.30 reîncepe atacul rusilor pe tot frontul batalionului. La ora 10 se reuseste patrunderea în pozitia companiei 1, pe un front de 200 m, iar infanteria si tancurile patrund în adancime si cad în spatele companiei cercetare, a carei pozitie de aparare este puternic atacata de front. Sunt aproape încercuit, dar mai pot face legatura cu vecinii germani din dreapta mea, carora le cer ajutor. Comunic situatia la batalion.

Locotenentul Cinteza Simion, ofiterul cu operatiile (prietenul meu), îmi comunica sa rezist cat pot, ca el vine cu un pluton în sprijinul meu si ca a cerut ajutor la Regimentul 116 infanterie germana. Rezist cu grupa mea de rezerva în santul de tragere din jurul postului meu de comanda alaturi de compania de pionieri germani pe care o am la mine. Tancurile pornite spre postul meu de comanda se opresc la circa 200 m, întrucat viroaga, pe care eu o stiam, se opune înaintarilor. Infanteria sovietica este supusa unui foc ucigator de arme automate capturate de noi în luptele din 12 ianuarie. Noaptea trece, dar rusii sunt tot în pozitia noastra.

 

30 ianuarie. Un batalion german de infanterie cu sase tunuri de asalt, la care se adauga si compania de pionieri, contraataca si restabileste situatia; astfel se reface linia de aparare la compania 1. Cele sase tancuri din spatele pozitiei mele sunt distruse. Întreaga linie de aparare a pozitiei batalionului este refacuta. Locotenentul Ionescu Lucian, comandantul companiei 1, este grav ranit în spate. Îl evacuez prin vecinii germani din stanga mea. Un prizonier facut de mine în 28 ianuarie 1943, elev de scoala militara, mi-a declarat ca în sectorul companiei mele ataca Regimentul 903 infanterie sovietic cu un efectiv de 3 000 oameni. Dupa trei zile de lupta au ramas circa 1 500 de oameni, restul fiind morti si raniti. Multi au fost împuscati de comisarii politici pentru nereusirea atacului. "3 000 contra 100. Bravo ostasi din compania cercetare!"

 

Luptele au continuat zilnic în acelasi mod, cu doua asalturi ziua si unul noaptea, pana în ziua de 4 februarie 1943, dar batalionul îsi pastreaza pozitia de aparare.

 

2 februarie. La un asalt al rusilor, cazemata Calugareni a fost redusa la tacere si, prin golul facut, circa 30 de rusi au patruns în pozitie, ajungand la postul meu de comanda.

 

Profitand de un moment de deruta al inamicului, am contraatacat cu grupa mea de rezerva de 10 oameni, dotati cu pistoale mitraliera rusesti, reusind sa-i scot din pozitie, jumatate cazand morti si raniti.

 

Țin sa mentionez ca în fata pozitiei mele, ca si în fata întregului front de aparare al batalionului, se formase un obstacol de cadavre peste care cu greu se mai putea trece de catre asaltatori, obstacol care ridica moralul luptatorilor mei si distrugea pe cel al atacatorilor.

 

4 februarie. Batalionul 6 vanatori de munte este schimbat din cauza oboselii si a uzurii fizice, de catre Batalionul 5 moti, cu exceptia sectorului companiei cercetare care a fost preluat de o companie din Regimentul 116 infanterie german, comandata de locotenentul Lang, care timp de doua luni îmi fusese vecin la stanga mea. Comandantul batalionului, capitanul Kraus, ramane placut impresionat de aspectul campului de lupta si ma felicita de felul cum am organizat si aparat pozitia pe acest front de 1 000 m pe timpul celor 10 zile de lupte înversunate.

Într-adevar, în fata Batalionului 6 vanatori de munte, dupa schimbarea lui, s-au putut numara peste 5000 de cadavre. În rastimpul de la 26 ianuarie la 4 februarie 1943, Batalionul 6 vanatori de munte a fost atacat de trei divizii de infanterie, una brigada independenta si una brigada de tancuri. Din 50 de tancuri care au intrat în lupta, 36 tancuri au fost distruse în interiorul si în fata pozitiei batalionului. La iesirea din dispozitivul de aparare, compania de cercetare avea 85 de luptatori fata de cei 100 cu care se începuse rezistenta în fata ofensivei rusesti. Pierderi avute: 5 morti si 10 raniti. În urma acestor lupte glorioase, Batalionul 6 vanatori de munte "Beius" primeste felicitari din partea comandantului Grupului "Wetzel", precum si din partea generalului von Schleinitz, comandantul Diviziei 9 infanterie germana, sub ordinele caruia a luptat si care îl denumeste "Batalionul de prusaci".

În ziua de 4 februarie 1943, dupa schimbare, Batalionul 6 vanatori de munte trece la Abinskaia ca rezerva a diviziei, pentru odihna si refacere.

 

6 februarie. La ora 12 ne adunam toti ofiterii la popota. Am ramas numai 12 ofiteri din cei 36 cati am plecat din garnizoana Beius (6 ofiteri erau plecati în tara, în concediu de odihna).

 

9 februarie. Soseste la Abinskaia, la comandamentul Diviziei 3 munte, domnul general Pantazi, ministrul apararii nationale si, ca trimis special al M.S. Regele Mihai I si al maresalului Antonescu, confera proprio motu, punand înaltul Ordin militar "Mihai Viteazul" clasa a III-a pe pieptul urmatorilor ofiteri din Batalionul 6 vanatori de munte: maior Petreanu Ioan, comandantul batalionului; locotenent Cinteza Simion, seful biroului operatii; sublocotenent Nicolescu Constantin, comandantul companiei cercetare; sublocotenent (r) Botocan Victor, comandantulcompaniei a 2-a; locotenent Ionescu Lucian, comandant compania I (absent si evacuat la Spitalul Krimskaia).

 

Domnul ministru Pantazi dispune ca batalionul sa întocmeasca si sa înainteze la Divizia 3 munte propunerea pentru decorarea drapelului unitatii cu Ordinul "Mihai Viteazul".

 

La masa festiva care a urmat, domnul capitan Bercea Nicolae, seful biroului operatii al Diviziei 3 munte, a mentionat ca din cate stie dansul, acum, din cele circa 70 unitati la nivel de batalion (divizion) care lupta în Caucaz, Batalionul 6 vanatori de munte este unica unitate care are cinci ofiteri decorati cu Ordinul "Mihai Viteazul". Auzind, domnul ministru a spus: "este posibil sa ramana cu acest record".

 

Marea ofensiva sovietica din 12 ianuarie 1943, al carei obiectiv a fost strapungerea pozitiei de aparare a Batalionului 6 vanatori de munte si ajungerea la Krimskaia pentru a realiza încercuirea fortelor germano-romane din spatiul caucazian (respectiv Armata 17 germana si sase divizii romane) nu s-a realizat, datorita rezistentei eroice a Batalionului 6 vanatori de munte "Beius", asupra caruia a fost îndreptata lovitura principala a acestei ofensive. Nici prezicerea din afisele semnate de generalul prizonier Romulus Dumitriu, aruncate din avion, ca "ne asteapta un al doilea Stalingrad" nu s-a realizat.

 

13 februarie. Batalionul 6 vanatori de munte primeste urmatorul ordin de la Regimentul 116 infanterie german - locotenent-colonel Welsser: Compania cercetare sublocotenent Nicolescu sa se deplaseze urgent pentru interventie în sprijinul divizionului de cavalerie al Diviziei 9 infanterie germane, al carui sector a fost atacat de rusi, care au rupt prima linie de aparare. Comandantul divizionului - capitanul Hanco; ma cunoaste bine din timpul luptelor din 12 ianuarie - 4 februarie cand comanda pe vecinii mei din stanga batalionului.

 

Plec imediat cu compania spre pozitia divizionului. Ajuns la postul de comanda iau legatura cu capitan Hanko, care ma informeaza ca o companie de puscasi rusi a rupt linia de aparare si a patruns în interiorul pozitiei. Revin la companie, amplasez un pluton si grupa de mitraliere în fata pozitiei de artilerie, pentru a bara si a opri înaintarea rusilor, iar cu doua plutoane ma strecor pe o viroaga cunoscuta si ajung la capitanul Hanko, care se repliase cu plutonul locotenentului Brendeke, în aparare. Contraatacam împreuna din flanc, restabilim linia de aparare rupta, instaland plutonul Brendeke pe vechile amplasamente. Reluam contraatacul din spate cu cele doua plutoane ale mele si lichidam compania de rusi patrunsa spre pozitia artileriei. Simtindu-se încercuiti si fiind somati, majoritatea rusilor se predau. Compania cercetare ramane la dispozitia diviziei de recunoastere (Aufklarung Abteilung - Ritmeister Hanko) în rezerva.

 

Noaptea de 17-18 februarie. Rusii ataca din nou. Lupta dureaza pana la ora 14, dar compania mea si aparatorii germani se opun patrunderii în pozitia de aparare. Atacul nu reuseste sa mai produca vreo spartura în linia de aparare. Este ranit grav fruntasul Daraban, tragatorul de la mitraliera. Este evacuat imediat de camarazii germani. Seara, ne cinstim cu o sticla de sampanie ruseasca - capitanul Hanko, locotenentul Brendeke si sublocotenentul Nicolescu, respectiv doi ofiteri germani din cavalerie si un ofiter roman. Simt ca între noi exista adevarata camaraderie de arme.

 

28-29-30 ianuarie. Germanii m-au ajutat cand eram aproape încercuit, trimitandu-mi o companie de pionieri în ajutor cu care am reusit sa rezist, pastrandu-mi intacta pozitia de aparare. Acum capitanul Hanko a solicitat nominal "Aufklarung Kompanie" Leutnant Nicolescu, pentru a interveni în sprijinul lui.

 

21 februarie. Capitanul Hanko îmi comunica la ora 14 ca trebuie sa plec cu compania mea la Batalionul 6 vanatori de munte, conform ordinului primit de la Regimentul 116 infanterie german. Ne luam la revedere. La plecare, locotenentul Brendeke, bunul meu camarad, mi-a spus: "rusii au ocupat Krasnodarul si au pornit spre Abinskaia. Sa dea Dumnezeu sa ajungem sa ne vedem în Crimeea", iar eu am zis: "daca se va lupta peste tot, asa cum a luptat Batalionul 6 vanatori de munte, sigur ne vom vedea în Crimeea". La ora 15.30 plec spre batalion. Marsul este foarte greu, ninsoare, zapada, viscol.

 

22 februarie. Ma prezint cu compania la batalion, care plecase de doua zile din Abinskaia, conform ordinului Regimentului 116 infanterie german si se gasea acum în pozitie de aparare pe Valea Abinului, sud de Abinskaia. Compania cercetare este în rezerva batalionului. Misiune: construirea unui adapost pentru post comanda batalion si organizarea unei linii de aparare pe care va sustine retragerea companiilor din linia întai pe o noua pozitie de aparare. Suntem informati ca rusii au ocupat Krasnodarul si mai au circa 60 de km pana la Abinskaia.

 

11 martie. Ne viziteaza domnul locotenent -colonel Welsser, comandantul Regimentului 116 infanterie german; este multumit de pozitia de aparare organizata de compania cercetare, în linia a II-a a batalionului.

 

Noaptea de 20 spre 21 martie. La ora 2 încep sa am dureri groaznice de stomac. La ora 7 comunic situatia la batalion si ca durerile nu înceteaza nici un moment. La ora 12 vine domnul capitan doctor Folescu, însotit de locotenentul Cinteza, ofiterul cu operatiile. Domnul doctor da diagnosticul de apendicita acuta si îmi face bilet de internare în spital. Simt o mare durere sufleteasca ca trebuie sa plec si sa-mi las ostasii cu care am împartit suferintele si greutatile, dar si bucuriile luptelor purtate împreuna. Îmi iau la revedere de la ei si la ora 13 plec dus pe targa de patru ostasi vanjosi din compania pe care o comandasem pana atunci timp de sase luni. Ostasii se grabesc sa ma scoata din zona bombardamentelor de artilerie. Dupa doua ore de transport pe targa, ajungem la "statia de trasuri germana". Ne îmbratisam, si cei patru ostasi pleaca inapoi la companie. Postul de prim ajutor german ma urca într-o sanie, bine învelit cupaturi si cu saculeti de nisip incalziti contra frigului si ma transporta la ambulanta germana. La ora 18, masina ambulantei ma duce la spitalul german din Krimskaia. Ma viziteaza doi doctori care îmi fac injectii pentru ameliorarea durerilor si apoi îmi spun ca nu-mi pot face operatie din cauza evacuarii spitalului si ca a doua zi voi pleca cu avionul în Crimeea.

 

22 martie. La ora 12 aterizam pe aeroportul Sarabuzo, în Crimeea, la 18 km de Simferopol. Era pentru mine prima calatorie cu avionul. Eram împreuna cu 22 de "evacuati". Toti au "votat" din cauza raului de aer. Eu m-am tinut tare. La ora 15 plec cu autosanitara romana la Simferopol si sunt internat în spitalul de companie nr. 7 al Corpului vanatori de munte, în camera nr. 19, unde se aflau opt ofiteri, între care am gasit si pe preotul batalionului meu, capitanul preot Lupsa Gheorghe.

 

23-26 martie. Sunt sub observatia si în grija domnului capitan doctor Manolescu pentru analizele necesare înaintea operatiei. În seara zilei de 23 martie 1943, ora 23.30, ascult la radio lista avansarilor în armata. Aud si numele meu: sunt avansat la gradul de locotenent. Multumesc lui Dumnezeu !

 

27 martie. Ora 10: bisturiul manuit de domnul doctor Manolescu, asistat de medicul sublocotenent (r) Popescu, intra în functiune. Operatia, cu anestezie locala, a mers bine, doctorii spunandu-mi tot timpul "bancuri". Au urmat 15 zile de spitalizare.

 

13 aprilie. Mi se face iesirea din spital si mi se înmaneaza biletul de voie pentru plecarea în concediul de odihna, emis de Corpul vanatorilor de munte. La ora 24 urc în tren în gara Simferopol si plec spre tara mea, spre patria mea pentru care luptasem în Caucaz.

 

16 aprilie. Ora 16: trec Nistrul la Tighina. Mare si bun este Dumnezeu ! Nu credeam sa mai am parte de aceasta bucurie ! Visez biletul de voie si concediul.

 

10 mai. Îmbracat în mantia alba, asist la parada zilei de 10 mai, avand loc rezervat în tribuna speciala a cavalerilor Ordinului "Mihai Viteazul" vis-a-vis de tribuna oficiala, din care M. S. Regele Mihai I si maresalul lon Antonescu primesc defilarea armatei.

 

19 mai. Plecare din Bucuresti, la ora 22; ajung la Tighina si trec Nistrul. Visul cel frumos a luat sfarsit.

 

24 mai. Ma prezint de sosire la comandantul Diviziei 3 munte, domnul general Mociulski Leonard, care ma retine cateva zile pentru a face instructie cu compania de mars a batalionului.

 

30 mai. Domnul general Mociulski ma prezinta noului comandant (venit din tara) al Batalionului 6 vanatori de munte: domnul locotenent-colonel Ionescu Paul. Domnul general mi se adreseaza astfel: "Viteazule, ia-l cu tine si învata-l razboiul", iar domnului locotenent-colonel îi spune: "Îl iei langa dumneata si îl treci ofiter cu operatiile al batalionului".

 

La ora 6 plec cu o masina, împreuna cu noul comandant, spre pozitia de lupta a batalionului.

Pe drum ne apuca o ploaie torentiala care ne face sa ramanem în drum trei ore. Nici o masina nu se mai poate misca. În acest timp asistam la un bombardament de aviatie si la lupte aeriene: sase avioane inamice se prabusesc sub ochii nostri. Plecam la drum si împingem la masina vreo cinci kilometri.

În aceasta situatie, ma întalnesc cu locotenentul german Brendeke, vecinul meu din stanga, cu care ne-am ajutat reciproc asta iarna. El pleaca în concediu spre tara lui, eu ma înapoiez la datorie. Din nou ne strangem mana si ne uram reciproc: "sa ne ajute Dumnezeu sa ne vedem în Crimeea". La ora 19 ajungem la Grecinskoi la P.C. grup 6 vanatori de munte, unde ramanem noaptea.

 

31 mai. Ma prezint la batalion cu noul comandant si raman ofiter cu operatiile al batalionului. Vad compania mea, putini au mai ramas. Bunul meu soldat de ordonanta, credinciosul meu Avram s-a dus - este o pierdere care ma doare mult. Batalionul se gaseste în linia a II-a, lucrand la o noua pozitie de aparare, la nord de Bakanskaia, la circa 50 de km vest de ultima pozitie de aparare de pe Valea Abinului, de unde eu am fost evacuat pentru internare în spital. În 70 de zile de lupte s-au cedat circa 50 km, batalionul ducand cu succes lupta în retragere pe pozitii de aparare succesive.

 

1-14 august. Divizia 3 munte si respectiv Batalionul 6 vanatori de munte au participat efectiv la luptele în retragere pe pozitii succesive de aparare, ultimele pozitii avandu-le pe litoralul Marii Negre la est de Anapa, spre orasul Taman.

 

14-20 august. Divizia 3 munte trece pe bacuri stramtoarea Kerci si se regrupeaza în Crimeea, iar Batalionului 6 vanatori de munte i se încredinteaza apararea litoralului sudic al Marii de Azov, în golful Kazantip.

 

5 octombrie. Batalionul primeste de la Divizia 3 munte ordinul Marelui Stat Major de mutare în tara la Şcoala de subofiteri infanterie Sibiu, pentru locotenentul Nicolescu Constantin. Înlocuitorul meu, prevazut în ordin, este sublocotenentul Scorus Nicolae din aceasta scoala.

 

8 octombrie. Batalionul expediaza prin agent "Memoriul-Propunere" pentru decorarea drapelului unitatii cu Ordinul "Mihai Viteazul".

 

21 octombrie. Soseste la batalion înlocuitorul meu, sublocotenent Scorus Nicolae de la Şcoala de subofiteri infanterie Sibiu. Trec pe la ostasii mei din compania cercetare de pe litoral, îi vad, vorbim, ei stiu ca sunt mutat, dar nu îmi iau la revedere de la ei fiindca nu m-am hotarat înca sa plec spre tara si îmi vine foarte greu sa ma despart de ei.

 

Noaptea de 24-25 octombrie. La ora 1 plec de la postul de comanda la locuinta si ma culc. La ora 2 vine la mine plutonierul Buzica, ajutorul meu de la biroul operatii, si îmi spune: "domnule locotenent, am ordin de la domnul locotenent-colonel Ionescu Paul sa va pregatesc de plecare, sa va urc în caruta si sa va duc la gara Semkolodosei si sa va urc în tren. Toate formele de plecare sunt semnate de domnul colonel, care acum este plecat, fiind chemat la divizie". Întreb: "Dar ce s-a întamplat?". "Nu stiu nimic", este raspunsul. Mi-am pus totul în lada de campanie, mi-am luat schiurile si am plecat împreuna la gara Semkolodosei. La ora 4 m-am urcat în trenul de "permisionar" si am plecat spre tara.

 

A fost ultimul tren care a iesit din Crimeea prin Stramtoarea Perecop, aceasta fiind deja blocata de tragerile artileriei rusesti.

 

Sublocotenent Constantin Nicolescu

mytzu

  • el ninio
  • Posts: 1564

mytzu

  • el ninio
  • Posts: 1564
Re: Filmari si povesti real ops
« Reply #9 on: June 02, 2015, 10:04:09 am »
Despre criza de la 1968:

http://adevarul.ro/locale/buzau/romania-razboiul-i-a-suflat-ceafa-1968-documente-secrete-despre-asaltul-sutelor-mii-soldati-rusi-unguri-1_556c44a4cfbe376e35d0345d/index.html

Quote
România şi războiul care i-a suflat în ceafă, în 1968. Documente secrete despre asaltul sutelor de mii de soldaţi ruşi şi unguri


România s-a aflat, în anul 1968, la un pas de un război, după ce conducerea ţării a condamnat invadarea Cehoslovaciei de către sovietici. Direcţia de Informaţii a Armatei (DIA) a centralizat atunci semnale care indicau pregătirea unei agresiuni externe asupra României.

La 20 august 1968, trupe sovietice şi din alte patru state membre ale Tratatului de la Varşovia (Republica Democrată Germană, Polonia, Ungaria si Bulgaria), au pătruns în Cehoslovacia, pentru a pune capăt procesului de reforme început de noua conducere a ţării, avându-l în frunte pe Alexander Dubcek.    Zeci de tancuri, precum şi mii de soldaţi au ocupat capitala Praga. În ţara noastră, televiziunea publică a transmis în direct imagini din timpul invaziei, generând o puternică emoţie printre români, dar şi revoltă.    România nu numai că nu a participat la această invazie, dar a şi condamnat-o în termeni duri. În dimineaţa zilei de 21 august 1968, în faţa sediului Comitetului Central al fostului PCR a avut loc o adunare publică, mulţimea simţind nevoia să condamne invazia laolaltă cu cei din conducerea ţării.   ”Imaginile prezentate, cu sute de soldaţi în acel kaki atât de obişnuit nouă, stând ciorchine în jurul coloşilor de metal şi având parte de o primire rece, nonviolentă a populaţiei civile, dar din privirile căreia se desprindea ura faţă de ocupanţi, au produs un mare şoc multor români, cărora li se oferea posibilitatea de a urmări pe viu ceea ce se întâmpla la Praga. Pericolul unei invazii sovietice şi în România a alimentat sentimentul unităţii naţionale şi hotărârea de a rezista”, scrie generalul de brigadă (r) Dumitru Miu, în cartea sa ”Batalionul 404 Cercetare - Istoria unor învingători”.   Nicolae Ceausescu, în mesajul adresat mulţimii, a calificat pătrunderea trupelor din Tratatul de la Varşovia în Cehoslovacia drept "o mare greşeala şi o primejdie gravă", spunând totodată că "nu există nici o justificare, nu poate fi acceptat nici un motiv de a admite, pentru o clipă numai, ideea intervenţiei militare în treburile interne ale unui stat socialist frăţesc".    Pentru prima oară după războaiele mondiale ale secolului XX, conducerea ţării, dar şi oamenii de rând, conştientizau pericolul izbucnirii unui conflict armat. Tensiunea s-a simţit mai ales printre militari, după ce conducerea României şi-a exprimat hotărârea de a opune rezistenţă armată în cazul unei ofensive împotriva României.   Iar temerile militarilor chiar au avut un fundament real, în acele zile serviciile de informaţii ale României adunând indicii despre concentrarea de trupe străine la graniţă.   Potrivit generalului Dumitru Miu, fost cadru în temuta unitate de ”spioni” a armatei, Batalionul 404 Cercetare în Adâncime prin Paraşutare de la Buzău, subordonată Direcţiei de Informaţii Militare, ”exista pericolul real ca şi ţara noastră să fie invadată, iar riposta armată trebuia să fie una hotărâtă”.      Potrivit unor foşti militari din conducerea armatei, la graniţa de nord - est şi în imediata lor apropiere au fost concentrate trupe sovietice, cu un efectiv de aproximativ 235.000 de militari. În paralel, mari unităţi maghiare au fost deplasate spre graniţele ţării noastre, concomitent cu trupele sovietice şi bulgare.   În această perioadă, unităţi ale flotei militare sovietice, printre care şi nave speciale de debarcare şi desant maritim, staţionau în dreptul gurilor Dunării şi al litoralului românesc, în afara apelor teritoriale.     Strategia lui Nicolae Ceauşescu era ca, în cazul unei invazii, România să ducă un război al întregului popor. De aceea, pentru ca România să ţină piept unei eventuale agresiuni externe, similare celei din Cehoslovacia, a înfiinţat Gărzile Patriotice.   ”Multe persoane care nu aveau deloc convingeri comuniste şi-au exprimat dorinţa în acele zile de a se înrola în nou formatele Gărzi Patriotice. Organizarea, echiparea şi înarmarea gărzilor patriotice s-au realizat în mai puţin de 48 de ore. Prin urmare, la parada militară din 23 august, din Bucureşti, au defilat 51 batalioane de gărzi patriotice, însumând 10.000 de oameni, echipaţi, înarmaţi şi cu o frumoasă ţinută ostăşească, provocând o puternică impresie celor aflaţi în tribune, printre care ambasadori şi ataşaţi militari din numeroase ţări”, notează generalul de brigadă Dumitru Miu, în volumul ”Batalionul 404 Cercetare - Istoria unor învingători”.   S-a mai pus accent pe organizarea şi executarea unei cercetări eficiente, în timp scurt, pentru descoperirea eventualelor concentrări de forţe şi mijloace în apropierea graniţei ţarii şi stabilirea momentului începerii unei posibile agresiuni externe.               * Cercetaşii buzoieni culegeau informaţii din spatele liniei inamice FOTO Arhivă Dumitru Miu   Amănunte despre tensiunile observate de cercetaşii armatei române ne oferă Ion Gheorghe, fost şef al Marelui Stat Major în perioada 1965-1974, autor a o serie de articole cu tematică militară, într-un interviu acordat maiorului Florin Şperlea, intitulat ”În 1968, armata română era pregătită să-şi apere ţara”.   Acesta strângea informaţiile cu ajutorul Direcţiei de Informaţii a Armatei, prin intermediul ataşaţilor militari şi de la Cercetarea radio a Direcţiei Informaţii Militare.    ”Totodată, o parte din informaţii îmi veneau de la grăniceri, prin surse specifice. Astfel, am aflat că, la Albiţa, militarii sovietici puteau fi văzuţi în ţinută de campanie, îndeplinind misiuni de recunoaştere şi cooperare în vederea desfăşurării unor posibile operaţii ulterioare. Nu era exclus ca unele dintre aceste acţiuni să fi fost făcute în scop de intimidare sau de diversiune, dar totul era cât se poate de real. La Reni, de exemplu, noaptea dădeau pontoanele la apă. La fel şi în Bulgaria, între Giurgiu şi Oinacu, iar la vest, trupele ungare executau diverse activităţi în direcţia punctelor de trecere a frontierei de la Borş şi Petea”, relatează Ion Gheorghe în interviul reprodus în volumul ”Batalionul 404 Cercetare - Istoria unor învingători”.    Potrivit fostului şef al Marelui Stat Major, spioni bulgari fuseseră trimişi în Bucureşti, pentru a pregăti informaţional un eventual plan de atac asupra ţării noastre.  ”Vecinii bulgari şi-au intensificat brusc activitatea de turism. Nu o dată, aşa zişii turişti bulgari, în majoritate bărbaţi tineri, cu ţinută atletică, părul tuns scurt, ceea ce lăsa să se întrevadă că sunt militari, se învârteau prin faţa magazinului Adam din imediata vecinătate a Ministerului Apărării Naţionale, situat pe atunci în Piaţa Valter Mărăcineanu. Toate aceste informaţii arătau atunci că suntem în mare pericol, iar convingerea că putem fi atacaţi oricând, era cât se poate de reală. Deşi raportul de forţe ne era total defavorabil, eram pregătiţi pentru o ripostă, chiar dacă eram practic încercuiţi”, a declarat Ion Gheorghe. Printre măsurile luate atunci de conducerea ţării, au fost crearea unui dispozitiv de apărare pe hartă, constituirea unui corp de armată la Poarta Focşanilor, înfiinţarea unui comandament de apărare a Capitalei, în subordinea căruia au intrat o parte din unităţile din Bucureşti, care ar fi trebuit să acţioneze pe direcţiile Urziceni-Bucureşti şi Giurgiu-Bucureşti. S-au trasat de asemenea măsuri pentru paza aeroporturilor Otopeni şi Băneasa şi s-a studiat posibilitatea distrugerii capului de pod de peste Dunăre de la Giurgiu-Ruse, măsură care urma să fie pusă în practică numai cu aprobarea lui Ceauşescu.                             * Pregătirea misiunii la Batalionul 404 Cc   ARHIVĂ Dumitru Miu   Armata Română a trecut la o mobilizare fără precedent, mulţi ofiţeri şi subofiţeri de la unităţi din interiorul ţării fiind detaşaţi timp de trei luni la baze din judeţele mai apropiate de graniţă, în special cea de est. Generalul (r) Mihai Chiriac a fost unul dintre ei. În acea perioadă, era încadrat ca cercetaş în structura Armatei a 2-a.   Mărturiseşte că, în primele zile de după alarmă, eşaloanele superioare erau foarte zgârcite în informaţii. Se informau doar de la comandamentele de mari unităţi şi de unităţi din dispozitivul de apărare pe aliniamentul de frontieră, de la unităţile de grăniceri, populaţia din zona de frontieră, respectiv români care erau în legătură cu locuitori de pe malul de est al Prutului şi posturile de radio străine, recepţionate cu aparate de radio portative personale.  ”Ne-am îmbarcat în două autobuze şi ne-am deplasat, pe timp de noapte, la Poligonul Mălina şi apoi într-o cazarmă din Focşani. Moda secretomaniei i-a determinat pe şefi să ne spună despre ce este vorba abia când am ajuns la prima destinaţie. (...) Timp de aproape trei luni de zile, nu am avut voie să luăm legătura cu familia, nici prin telefon, nici prin corespondenţă. Soţia mea, singură cu doi copii a aflat, după două luni de zile, de la un ofiţer de contrainformaţii, că sunt în viaţă şi sănătos într-un oraş din Moldova”, a povestit gl. bg. (r) Mihai Chiriac în volumul ”Carieră de cercetaş. Spicuiri de memorii, în Cercetaşii elita Armatei României – istorie şi actualitate”. Au fost trase focuri de armă în ţară   O altă măsură extrem de importantă pentru stăvilirea unei eventuale invazii a fost transformarea urgentă a bazei aeriene de la Bacău în aeroport militar, singurul din Moldova, conducerea revenindu-i colonelului Ioan Puia, comandantul Centrului de Instrucţie al Piloţilor din Bacău.   ”În noaptea de 21 spre 22 august, o formaţie de 20 de avioane MIG 15 au fost deplasate la Bacău, şi dirijate, în linie, spre aeroportul militar, deoarece la graniţa de la Prut apăruseră, deja trupe ruseşti. MIG-urile au venit, cu piloţi, cu tot, de la Buzău. A fost chemat, de urgenţă, la aeroport şi colonelul Aurel Cantoneru, comandantul regimentului de tancuri, şi de la regimentul de artilerie antiaeriană de la Râmnicu Sărat au fost trimise, tot în noaptea de 21 spre 22 august, 20 de tunuri antiaeriene”, a declarat colonelul Ioan Puia pentru o publicaţie locală.    Toată comanda grupului de apărare constituit la aeroportul militar, în care era inclusă şi o unitate de securitate, a trecut în subordinea colonelului Puia. Acesta îşi aminteşte că venirea tunurilor antiaeriene de la Râmnicu Sărat era să ducă la un măcel la aeroport.    ”Unitatea de securitate înclusă în grupul de apărare de la aeroport nu a ştiut de venirea tunurilor de la Râmnicu Sărat, iar în dimineaţa zile de 22 august, când şi-au făcut apariţia la poarta aerodromului, asupra lor au fost deschise focuri de armă, fiind confundaţi, de către cei de la securitate, cu trupele sovietice. Era să iasă măcel. Am fost anunţat imediat şi am dat comandă trupelor de securitate să oprească focul”, a povestit Ioan Puia.   Tensiunea a plutit în aer timp de zece zile printre militarii şi personalul aerodromului militar Bacău, care ascultau, zi şi noapte, un radio deschis pe postul Europa Liberă, cu toată că locul era înţesat de ofiţeri de securitate.    O invazie asemănătoare celei din Cehoslovacia prindea România total nepregătită, cred specialiştii militari implicaţi în acea perioadă în coordonarea apărării   Generalul Florian Truţă, la acea perioadă şeful Secţiei 1, care centraliza, analiza, sintetiza şi raporta evoluţiile în situaţia politico-militară, cu accentul pe cele ce primejduiau apărarea şi securitatea României, din Direcţia Informaţii Militare, menţiona că „nu mai era un inamic ipotetic, luat din memoratoare, ci era vorba de o politică agresivă la adresa ţării noastre şi de grupuri puternice de trupe, gata de luptă permanent, desfăşurate la frontierele de stat ale României”.     Potrivit acestuia, volumul de informaţii era mare, iar sursele foarte diversificate, de la forţele şi mijloacele profesionalizate specializate, la oameni simpli, care, din patriotism, voiau să ajute ţara.   Contextul era unul total defavorabil ţării noastre. Pe toată lungimea frontierei ţării noastre, mai puţin 546 kilometri reprezentând graniţa cu Iugoslavia, România era învecinată cu „ţările invadatoare”.    ”Eram în situaţia unei ţări şi armate încercuite încă înainte de începerea sau desfăşurarea vreunei acţiuni militare. Agresorii, probabil, cunoşteau valoarea şi dislocarea forţelor noastre armate, inclusiv a forţelor şi mijloacelor de cercetare. Forţele şi mijloacele noastre de cercetare erau şi cantitativ şi calitativ insuficiente, iar o parte a tehnicii de luptă depăşită. Acţiunile noastre de cercetare trebuiau executate cu o deosebită precauţie şi iscusinţă pentru a nu viola frontierele vecinilor şi a crea pretexte, care să justifice invazia. Marile puteri nu au luat o atitudine evidentă, similară cu cea luată în conflictul Irak-Kuwait, pentru a impune retragerea forţelor invadadoare din Cehoslovacia. Ţara noastră se găsea izolată şi singură într-o eventuală confruntare cu forţe superioare”, a declarat generalul Florian Truţă, citat în volumul Batalionul 404 Cercetare - Istoria unor învingători”.   Tensiunile militare, percepute din interiorul Batalionului 404 Cercetare - Diversiune, din Buzău   În 1968, militarii Batalionul 404 Cercetare se instruiau conform statului de organizare, executând aplicaţii în tabere, la apă, la munte, în teren muntos împădurit şi alte condiţii speciale. În vara anului 1968, colonelul (r) Dumitru Buligioiu era ofiţer la temuta unitate care era amplasată atunci în Crângul Buzăului.    „Nu cred că era ora 10.00 când, prin notă telefonică, de la eşalonul superior, se ordona încetarea programului pentru ca tot personalul unităţii să fie prezent în faţa televizoarelor spre a urmări comunicatul pentru ţară, transmis de preşedintele României. (...) Concomitent cu ceea ce se petrecea în Capitală, unde zeci de mii de oameni scandau, aprobator, hotărârea României, eşaloanele militare superioare au transmis către unităţile militare operative şi subordonate o serie de ordine referitoare la completarea cu efective a unor unităţi, completarea stocurilor de mobilizare, intensificarea pregătirii de luptă, realizarea în zona frontierei de stat a unei grupe de conducere a forţelor existente în zonă”, relatează Dumitru Buligioiu în volumul dedicat cercetaşilor buzoieni.    Potrivit fostului ofiţer de la Batalionul 404 Cercetare, efectivele trebuiau scoase în raioanele de antrenament pentru mobilizare sau de mobilizare numai la ordin. Totodată, muniţia de război trebuia scoasă din depozite la nivelul unei unităţi de foc pentru fiecare luptător, dar să nu se distribuie decât la ordin, cu excepţia militarilor care asigurau paza obiectivelor de orice fel. De asemenea, erau prevăzute măsuri privind asigurarea hrănirii efectivelor.                      * Cercetaşii buzoieni culegeau informaţii din spatele liniei inamice Arhivă Dumitru Mi   La un moment dat, Batalionul 404 Cercetare a primit ordin de la Direcţia de Informaţii a Armatei să pregătească de misiune opt grupuri de cercetare, formate din câte cinci militari, din care unul să fie ofiţer, echipaţi în ţinută civilă şi având asupra lor hrană rece pentru două zile.   Nici nu se reuşise să se definitiveze cele opt grupuri că, de la D.I.A. a sosit cu un autoturism de teren un grup de cinci ofiţeri superiori, sub comanda col. Ioan Constantin, şeful Biroului cercetare de specialitate, pentru a pregăti grupurile de cercetare din punct de vedere tactic, după cum mărturiseşte Buligioiu.    ”În 6-7 ore de la sosire, Grupa operativă de la D.I.A. împreună cu cei din comanda B. 404 Cc. au reuşit să pregătească cele 8 grupuri şi 4-6 cercetaşi independenţi, iar către orele 16.30-17.00, pe 21 august, elementele constituite puteau executa ordinul de deplasare către raioanele de acţiune în vederea îndeplinirii misiunilor. Raioanele de acţiune şi misiunile erau cunoscute doar de comandanţii de grupuri şi ofiţerii din Grupa operativă de la D.I.A. care le făcuse pregătirea şi le dăduse ordinul de misiune de luptă”, spune Dumitru Buligioiu.   În prima fază, atât grupurile de cercetare, cât şi cercetaşii independenţi trebuiau să acţioneze pe graniţa de est şi nord-est a României, între Rădăuţi şi Galaţi. Deplasarea grupurilor şi a cercetaşilor independenţi, în raioanele de acţiune, urma să se facă cu trenul.   Cursul favorabil al evenimentelor din zilele următoare a făcut însă ca misiunea cercetaşilor să nu-şi mai aibă rostul.    În vara anului 1968, un număr de 7.000 de tancuri şi jumătate de milion de soldaţi, cei mai mulţi sovietici, au invadat Cehoslovacia. Intervenţia trupelor Tratatului de la Varşovia s-a soldat cu 72 de morţi în rândul civililor.     CITEŞTE ŞI: Baştan, inventatorul paraşutei militare româneşti, a deţinut 45 de ani un record naţional şi a sărit din avion cu fiul în braţe, pentru a face o demonstraţie   Generalul Grigore Baştan este considerat părintele paraşutiştilor militari români. Pe lângă meritele de a reforma această armă de elită, Baştan a devenit un reper în istoria paraşutiştilor. A deţinut timp de 45 de ani recordul naţional la saltul cu paraşuta, până pe 12 aprilie 2015, şi a sărit cu fiul său în braţe, pentru a demonstra cât de sigură e paraşuta inventată de el.  [/qote]

mytzu

  • el ninio
  • Posts: 1564
Re: Filmari si povesti real ops
« Reply #10 on: August 09, 2015, 07:56:57 am »
http://www.dailystar.co.uk/news/latest-news/458253/SAS-sniper-kills-Isis-thug-executioner-save-boy-dad

Quote
Executioner killed: SAS sniper took out Isis thug to save boy and dad

AN SAS sniper saved the lives of a father and son just seconds before they were about to be executed by a knife-wielding jihadi.

He killed the would-be executioner from a range of 1,000m with a head shot before taking out three other members of Isis in Syria.

The father and his eight-year-old boy were just seconds from death after refusing to denounce their faith.

Both are Shia Muslims who Isis regard as "infidels". But the pair refused and were facing imminent death.

The shooting occurred last month in Northern Syria, close to the border with Turkey where the SAS unit had been conducting covert patrols.

Defence sources said the British special forces were alerted by an Iraqi spy.

The SAS unit moved into a position just outside a village where Isis members were holding a trial in front of a crowd of locals.

The crack team considered calling in an air strike using a Reaper Drone but the elite troops feared many innocent civilians who had been forced to watch the executions might also be killed.

Instead the SAS unit decided on a risky long-range kill using the team’s sniper.

One source said: “There were several decapitated bodies already lying on the ground.

"Through binoculars the soldiers could see that the crowd were terrified and many were in tears."

A man and a young boy were dragged out in front of the crowd and were made to kneel down.

"They were both wearing blindfolds and looked terrified.

"A tall bearded man emerged and drew a long knife."He began addressing the crowd and slapping the father and his son around the head and kicking them on to the floor.

"Standing either side of the executioner were two other Isis fighters, both armed with AK47s."

The SAS marksman, using a .50 calibre sniper rifle fitted with a silencer, killed the executioner just in time.

The source added: "The Isis thug who was about to decapitate the father was shot in the head and collapsed.

"Everyone just stared in confusion.

"The sniper then dispatched the two henchmen with single shots – three kills with three bullets.

"Someone from the crowd then ran over and untied the father and son’s hands and took their blindfolds off.

"They just stared at the bodies and then ran.

"They were last seen heading towards the Turkish border in a pick-up truck.

"It was a good day’s work."

The SAS team was later told the village held a party to celebrate the deaths of the Isis fighters and it is understood terrorists have since refused to enter the town.

SAS teams have fought alongside resistance fighters in both Iraq and Syria for more than a year.

 

'; include_once($boarddir.'/yshout/yshout.php'); echo '